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DISPELLING TINA'St GHOST FROM THE POST-
ENRON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DEBATE
Michael E. Murphy*
"One of the marks of a truly dominant intellectual paradigm is the
difficulty people have in even imagining any alternative view."]
I. INTRODUCTION
As the fallout from the Enron debacle settles, imagine a
hypothetical poll: "Corporations in the United States are typically
driven by a narrow agenda, suiting the interests of a self-aggrandizing
executive elite, which is destructive to the environment, culturally
degrading, and harmful to community and family life." Do you agree?
Mark: (a) fully and without equivocation, (b) in some respects, or (c)
are you serious? - such an intemperate view of American business
should be rejected out of hand.
Those who would mark choice (a) are a diverse group,
representing a significant presence in our body politic. They include
many active environmentalists, a portion of the religious left,
communitarian philosophers, the radical wing of the labor movement,
opponents of NAFTA 2 and the WTO 3, student sweatshop activists, and
t TINA is an acronym for "There is no alternative." The expression became popular
in the United Kingdom among critics of Margaret Thatcher's government because of her
penchant for justifying policies with the explanation: "There is no alternative." See DANIEL
SINGER, WHOSE MILLEN1UM? THEIRS OR OURS 1-2 (1999); David Ost, Letter from Poland,
THE NATION, Nov. 25, 2002, at 16.
* Judicial Attorney, California Court of Appeal, First District; Ph.D., University of
California, Berkeley, J.D., Stanford University; B.A., Harvard University; Lecturer,
Geography Department, University of Texas at Austin, 1986-1987.
1. William T. Allen, Contracts and Communities in Corporation Law, 50 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 1395, 1401 (1993) (Allen was a chancellor at the Delaware Court of Chancery).
2. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Mex.-Can., 32 I.L.M
605. January 1, 2002 marks the eight year anniversary of the implementation of the North
American Free Trade Agreement, which was created jointly by the United States, Canada,
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Pacifica Radio listeners4--in short, the coalition of environmentalists,
trade unionists, ministers, and non-violent protesters who surged in
unexpected numbers on the streets of Seattle in November, 1999. They
are likely to view the Enron controversy as a call for close
governmental oversight of corporate accounting.
A majority of Americans would probably settle for choice (b).
They may cheer anti-corporate rhetoric, applaud Erin Brockovich, and
complain about Enron and the pharmaceutical industry, but they are
excited by the rapid development of the high tech sector, value their
401(k) accounts, shrug at complaints about globalization, and admire
notable business leaders, such as Jack Welch, Ted Turner, and Bill
Gates.
Those who would mark choice (c) are likely to remain unshaken
in their belief that, despite the Enron scandal, business can clean up its
own house without government interference. They are not confined to
the business community but include cultural and political conservatives
and the dominant schools of thought in academic departments of law,
business, and economics. In law schools, the most intellectually
sophisticated scholarship on the corporation has unquestionably come
from the law-and-economics tradition.5 Legal scholars dissenting from
this tradition are relatively few and exceedingly moderate.6
The corporation is a subject that tends to polarize reasonable
people into isolated and opposed bodies of opinion. The aura of
consensus that one finds in the law-and-economics literature is also
found in the writings of environmentalists 7 and cultural critics,8 who
and Mexico to create a free trade zone. See Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade, Overview of the NAFTA, at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/nafta-alena/over-e.asp
(2001).
3. Located in Geneva, Switzerland, the World Trade Organization was established in
January 1, 1995. For more information, please visit the official WTO site, at
http://www.wto.org.
4. Pacifica Radio is a voice of the non-corporate media.
5. See Allen, supra note 1, at 1399.
6. See, e.g., PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995);
Constance E. Bagley & Karen L. Page, The Devil Made Me Do It: Replacing Corporate
Directors' Veil of Secrecy with the Mantle of Stewardship, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 897
(1999); Thomas Lee Hazen, The Corporate Persona, Contract (and Market) Failure, and
Moral Values, 69 N.C. L. REV. 273 (1991); David Millon, New Directions in Corporate
Law: Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1373 (1993).
7. See, e.g., ROSS GELBSPAN, THE HEAT IS ON: THE HIGH STAKES BATTLE OVER
EARTH'S THREATENED CLIMATE 33-61 (1997); GEORGE A. GONZALEZ, THE POLITICAL
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hold a starkly contradictory point of view. It is worth noting, however,
that the idea of shareholder accountability yields a tenuous common
ground. The anti-corporate activists may be interested in social and
environmental issues, while the institutional investor and academician
may be concerned about economic distortions, but all oppose
management autonomy and are likely to favor private democratic
controls.
9
Wherever one stands in this spectrum of opinion, it must be
conceded that the characteristic form of the U.S. corporation, with the
dissociation of shareownership from active management, has a political
and cultural history as well as an economic and technical basis.10 Other
industrial countries have experienced historical influences that have
resulted in significantly divergent models for the corporation. Usually,
large institutional investors and banks exert a degree of control over
corporate governance."1 In Japan, for example, the corporation
typically maintains close relations with a particular bank that owns up
to 5% of the corporation's stock and plays a backup role in monitoring
management performance, intervening when it deems necessary. 2
During the post-World War II era, most western European countries
engaged in a vigorous debate about "industrial democracy," which led
to active experimentation in bringing employees into corporate
governance. Five countries (Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark,
ECONOMY OF U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: CORPORATE POWER AND THE ENVIRONMENT
(2001).
8. See, e.g., THOMAS FRANK, ONE MARKET UNDER GOD: EXTREME CAPITALISM,
MARKET POPULISM, AND THE END OF ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY (2000); JEAN KILBOURNE,
CAN'T BUY MY LOVE: How ADVERTISING CHANGES THE WAY WE THINK AND FEEL
(1999); NAOMI KLEIN, NO LOGO, MONEY MARKETING, AND THE GROWING ANTI-
CORPORATE MOVEMENT (1999).
9. Management does not enjoy unqualified autonomy even in the absence of any
direct accountability to shareholders through the processes of corporate governance. In a
competitive industry, the market imposes constraints on management's freedom of action
that are likely to mirror the interests of shareholders in many, but not all respects. See
generally Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON.
288 (1980).
10. The classic analysis is found in ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (rev. ed. 1967).
11. See Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM.
L. REV. 10, 11, 15-17 (1991).
12. See Zenichi Shishido, Japanese Corporate Governance: The Hidden Problems of
Corporate Law and Their Solution, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 189, 209, 211 (2000); see generally
Michael Bradley et al., Challenges to Corporate Governance: The Purposes and
Accountability of the Corporation in Contemporary Society: Corporate Governance at a
Crossroads, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1999); Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe,
Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Corporate Governance and
Industrial Organization, 102 YALE L.J. 871 (1993).
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Sweden, and Austria) have provided for employee representation in the
board of certain corporations, and the Fifth Directive on Company Law
of the European Union now allows companies to choose among four
models of corporate organization, three of which assign employees a
role in governance.
13
Perhaps the most successful of these alternative models is the two-
tiered board of the large German publicly owned company, the
Aktiengesellschafien or AG company, which enfranchises both
employees and certain other stakeholders.14 Employee representatives
sit on the supervisory board beside shareholder representatives who
commonly include bankers, local community leaders, suppliers, and
customers. The supervisory board possesses ultimate authority and
oversees a lower operational board, composed of top executives.' 5 In
1976, the German federal government introduced a measure that
expanded employee representation by requiring that the supervisory
board be composed almost equally of employee and shareholder
representatives-almost because one employee director is chosen from
the ranks of management and the chairman, with the deciding vote, is
appointed by shareholders.' 6  The measure was supported by all
political parties.' 7 British historian John Gray, believes that "[t]he
dispersal of power among a range of stakeholders in the German
system is central in accounting for its low levels of economic
inequality in comparison with Anglo-Saxon economies.,' 8
Both the European and Japanese models of corporate governance
are rooted in precedents and culture of their own regions.' 9 They may
13. See Kenneth Wedderbum, Companies and Employees: Common Law or Social
Dimension, 109 LAW Q. REV. 220, 232-35 (1993); see also David Charny, Competition
among Jurisdictions in Formulating Corporate Law Rules: An American Perspective on the
"Race to the Bottom" in the European Community, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 423, 454 n.83
(1991); Clark D. Stith, Federalism and Company Law, 79 GEO. L.J. 1581, 1591, 1598
(1991).
14. See also Willi Joachim, The Liability of Supervisory Board Directors in Germany,
25 INT'L LAW. 41, 42-51 (1991); see also J. Shearman, Corporate Governance- an
Overview of the German Aufsichtsrat, 1995 J. BUS. L. 517, 531; see generally Susan-
Jacqueline Butler, Models of Modern Corporations: A Comparative Analysis of German &
U.S. Corporate Structures, 17 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 555 (2000).
15. See Butler, supra note 14, at 563-66.
16. See Joachim, supra note 14, at 48.
17. See Shearman, supra note 14, at 531.
18. JOHN GRAY, FALSE DAWN: THE DELUSIONS OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM 93 (1998).
19. For a theoretical discussion of the divergence of corporate form despite the
homogenizing tendencies of the global market, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A
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suggest the range of possibilities, but they cannot be transplanted
directly to the foreign soil of the United States. Corporate reforms here
must modify existing institutions in ways consistent with U.S. political
history. The problem is that the American corporation today is not
consistent with our own political traditions. There is a sharp
dissonance between the values honored in other areas of social life and
the futile proxy contexts, meaningless shareholder meetings,
management autonomy, and impersonal, hierarchical structure of the
corporation. This dissonance may account for much of the discontent
with the corporation in our society.
One point seems clear enough to serve as a compass for our
inquiry. It is consistent with our shared democratic traditions to hold
the corporation accountable, to the extent practicable, to the groups
most affected by its activities. This inquiry avoids abstract standards of
performance, whether related to wealth maximization or social
responsibility, and proceeds instead from the premise that, in the long
run, institutions are best designed to serve the interests, expectations,
desires, and values of their constituencies.
As Merrick Dodd long ago observed, there are three groups of
people with an interest in the activities of corporate management: the
shareholders, the employees, and the general public.20  The goal of
accountability to shareholders can be sought in the internal controls of
a private system of corporate governance. To the extent that it
achieves shareholder accountability, corporate governance offers the
great practical advantage of all democratic structures: it is, to some
extent, self-regulating. The interests of employees and the general
public ordinarily call for external controls enforced by governmental
oversight, but the norms and procedures of shareholder democracy also
present certain possibilities for incorporating an employee and
community voice into a self-regulating system of corporate
governance.
This article investigates, first, the ways of restoring corporate
accountability to shareholders, particularly minority shareholders and
those institutional shareholders that represent the most numerous and
diverse constituencies in our society. This inquiry leads to the concept
of representative associations of institutional investors and to the
Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV.
127 (1999).
20. See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45
HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1154-55 (1932).
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necessity of federal standards for corporate governance. The
discussion of shareholder democracy provides a context for exploring
ways the employee voice can be incorporated into a self-regulating
system serving the interests of shareholders. Lastly, touching obliquely
on the broad topic of the relationship between the corporation and the
general public, this article will discuss the convergence of
management's fiduciary responsibility with social aspirations of
important shareholder constituencies.
II. THE CORPORATION AND SHAREHOLDERS
A. Social Patterns of Shareownership
Twenty years ago, Robert Charles Clark remarked, "Increased
sharing in benefits and decreased sharing in power: one wonders
whether any of the early commentators on capitalist enterprise, from
Adam Smith to Karl Marx, correctly anticipated that this would be the
evolutionary pattern of the capitalist system."2  Clark would be
obliged today to add a minor qualification. The 1990s have witnessed
a modest resurgence of shareholder activism among institutional
investors that has checked the trend toward decreasing control. Yet,
the paradox of widespread ownership and limited access to power
remains a central feature of corporate enterprise in the United States.
What would be the consequence of reversing this historical pattern
by effectively enfranchising all shareholders? Three perspectives may
lend some insight into the possibilities of change latent within the
broad shareholder constituency: the demographic breadth within the
population of individual shareholders, the sphere of influence enjoyed
by institutional shareholder groups with a capacity and incentive for
activism, and the proclivities of the larger body of institutional
investors.
The New York Stock Exchange estimated that 48.5 million
individuals directly held corporate stock or mutual fund shares in 1998,
compared to 31.5 million individuals in 1989.22 If the shareowning
21. Robert C. Clark, The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on Investment
Management Treatises, 94 HARV. L. REV. 561, 568 (1981).
22. See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, SHAREOWNERSHIP 2000 17, 19-20 (2000)
[hereinafter N.Y. STOCK EXCH.], available at
http://www.nyse.com/marketinfo/shareownersurvey.html. The New York Stock Exchange
report is based on the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances conducted by the Survey
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public is more broadly defined to include indirect ownership through
participation in self-directed retirement accounts or defined-
contribution pension plans, the number of shareowners during 1998
was 84 million individuals, an increase from 52.3 million individuals in
1989. As so defined, the percentage of adults over the age of 18 who
were shareholders in 1998 was at least 43.5%.23
Shareownership is, of course, strongly weighted toward the
wealthy. The median stock portfolio value in 1998 was only $28,000,
while the mean portfolio value was $148,500-more than five times as
large. 24 Nevertheless, shareownership among less privileged groups in
society was by no means negligible. Counting both direct and indirect
ownership, shareowners with a family income of $50,000 or less held
roughly 7% of all corporate stock and those with a family income of
$75,000 or less held about 15.1% of all corporate stock. 25
Shareowners without a college degree held 21.0% of all corporate
stock, and shareholders within the occupational categories of service or
craftspersons, laborers and farmers, and clerical, technical, or sales
persons accounted for 11.1% of all corporate stock ownership. 26 Direct
ownership was not unusual in the lower economic strata. For example,
16.9% of shareowners with a family income of less than $50,000, who
were household heads or spouses of household heads, held stock
directly.
2 7
Research Center at the University of Michigan for the Federal Reserve Board. The
Investment Company Institute and the Securities Industry Association have published the
only other statistical study of shareownership. See INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE &
SECURITIES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, EQUITY OWNERSHIP IN AMERICA (1999), available at
http://investmentcompanyinstitute&securitiesindustryassociation.com. The differences
between the two reports are sufficiently small so as not to affect the general perspectives
presented here.
23. See N.Y. STOCK EXCH., supra note 22, at 15-16.
24. See id. at 19.
25. See id. at 25, 33. The available source of data on aggregate ownership of corporate
stock is found in publications of the Federal Reserve Board's "Flow of Funds" accounts,
which unfortunately employ a different system of classifying investment sectors than the
Consumer Research Surveys. The estimates here follow the New York Stock Exchange
analysis by adding direct household holdings and the indirect household holdings of private
pension funds and mutual funds. The figure for direct household holdings is reduced by 5%
to reflect the estimated holdings of non-profits, which the Federal Reserve oddly includes in
the household sector. See id.
26. See id. at 24-25. The New York Stock Exchange analysis provides the percentages
of individual shareownership represented by these categories of shareholders. These
percentages have been recalculated as a percentage of total stock ownership by the method
explained in note 25.
27. See id at 29.
2002]
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A different kind of insight into the potential influence of
shareholder constituencies may be gained by surveying the institutional
sectors with a demonstrated capacity for shareholder activism, in
particular union-related pension funds and the cluster of institutions
devoted to socially responsive investing. The term "union pension
fund" usually refers to the joint-trusted funds established under the
Taft-Hartley Act. 28 The Act bars employers from making contributions
to union-managed funds unless the funds meet certain requirements-
most notably, they must be administered by an equal number of
trustees appointed by management and the union. 29 These plans, often
called Taft-Hartley plans, commonly cover multi-employer bargaining
units or the entire union membership.3° Typical examples are the
Carpenters Pension Trust for Southern California and the International
Association of Machinists National Pension Fund. Despite the
statutory scheme, Taft-Hartley plans tend to be dominated by union
trustees.31 Management trustees lack an incentive to become actively
involved in investment decisions since management is obliged only to
make a fixed contribution that will not change whether the fund
investments fail or succeed.32
It has been estimated that 40% of all collectively bargained
pension plans are Taft-Hartley plans.33 Another very small category of
plans, funded by union or worker contributions, are directly managed
by unions. 34  Other pension plans established through collective
bargaining are in fact administered by employers. In these plans, the
union role is limited to bargaining over the level of contributions or
benefits. Although union members are the beneficiaries of the plans,
the employer appoints the trustees-typically corporate officers who
have full control over administrative or investment decisions.35
The Department of Labor statistics provide an approximation of
28. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 141.
29. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 302(a)(1) and (c), 29 U.S.C.
§ 186(a)(1) and (c) (1998).
30. See id.
3 1. See Council of Institutional Investors, Council Membership, at
http://www.cii.org/memberdirectory.asp (last visited Nov. 15, 2002).
32. See Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance:
Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 1018, 1076-1077 (1998).
33. See id. at 1076.
34. See id. at 1076 n.270.
35. See id. at 1075.
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the size of the shareholder constituency represented by labor unions,
though a precise calculation is impossible. The Department of Labor
reports that collectively bargained pension plans accounted for 34% of
all private pension fund assets in 1997.36 It offers no comparable figure
for collectively bargained plans in the public sector. Nevertheless, if
one considers the amount of corporate equities held by private and
public pension plans,37 it seems likely that corporate equities held by
pension funds benefiting employees in collective bargaining units
accounted for something in the range of 4% to 5% of all corporate
equities.38 Since very few individual shareholders vote in corporate
elections, the labor pension funds account for a much higher
percentage of stock that is actually voted.
Using their limited base in Taft-Hartley plans, unions aggressively
pursued shareholder activism in the 1990s. 39  The Industrial Union
Department of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of
Industrial Organization (AFL-CIO) calls on union pension funds "to
screen and actively target or exclude certain types of investment as a
means of advancing the multiple and long-term economic and social
objectives of plan participants. 40 Sometimes unions have engaged in
"corporate campaigns" to put pressure on employers to yield
concessions in collective bargaining, but they have also joined with
other institutional investors in advocating corporate governance
measures such as confidential balloting, appointment of independent
directors, and exclusion of inside directors from audit, nominating, and
compensation committees.
41
36. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, ABSTRACT OF 1997 FORM 5500 ANNUAL REPORTS,
PRIVATE PENSION PLAN BULLETIN, Winter 2001, at Table A.6.
37. Private pension plans accounted for about 14% of all domestic corporate equities
outstanding, and state and local pension funds accounted for about 11 percent. See NEW
YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, FACT BOOK 59 (1999) [hereinafter N.Y. STOCK EXCH.].
38. The figure that is relevant for our analysis is the amount of domestic equities held
directly by Taft-Hartley plans or indirectly by defined contribution plans of employees in
the private and public sector who belong to collective bargaining units. To roughly estimate
this figure, it is not enough to multiply all private pension equities by the relative importance
of assets held by collectively bargained plans; it is necessary also to deduct equities held by
non-Taft-Hartley defined benefit plans in the private sector and add indirect ownership of
equities in collective bargaining units in the public sector. The breakdown needed for a
refined estimate is not available in published Department of Labor data. For a somewhat
higher estimate, see Teresa Ghilarducci, SMALL BENEFITS, BIG PENSION FUNDS, AND How
GOVERNANCE REFORMS CAN CLOSE THE GAP IN WORKING CAPITAL: THE POWER OF
LABOR'S PENSIONS 166 (Archon Fung, Tessa Hebb, and Joel Rogers eds., 2001).
39. See Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein, From Wall Street Walk to Wall Street Talk: The
Changing Face of Corporate Governance, 11 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 43, 73, 85-97 (1998).
40. Schwab & Thomas, supra note 32, at 1078 n.287.
41. See id. at 1019-29. The Council of Institutional Investors is a coalition primarily of
Taft-Hartley plans and public employee pension funds. See Council of Institutional
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In contrast to the coherent objectives of union shareholder
activism, the phenomenon of socially responsive investing presents a
multiplicity of voices. Some socially directed funds serve idiosyncratic
causes such as vegetarianism, animal rights, or a pro-life agenda; still
others have a short list of disparate restrictions that barely distinguish
them from other funds.4 2 Nevertheless, a core group of mutual funds in
the field of ethical investing actively pursue concerns of important
constituencies in American life, such as environmentalism and the
equal treatment of workers. Socially oriented funds grew explosively
in the 1990s and held corporate equities worth $154 billion in 1999, or
about 1% of all corporate equities.43 These funds find a natural ally in
the Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility, which serves a
coalition of Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish institutional endowments
and pension funds controlling about $100 billion in assets and an
unreported quantity of corporate equities."
The Social Investment Forum, a trade association of socially
responsive investors, identifies shareholder activism as one of its three
central objectives-the other two being the screening of investments and
promoting local community involvement. 45  The mutual funds
represented by the association, together with allied groups such as the
Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility, control sufficient assets
to serve as a catalyst in forming shareholder coalitions. In addition,
these funds are in a position to serve as conduits of information to a
Investors, Corporate Governance Policies, at http://www.cii.org/corpgovernance.htm (last
visited January 10, 2002).
42. See, e.g., Patrick McGeehan, A Socially Responsible Fund: Whose Conscience is it
Anyway?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2000, at BU28; Brenda Moore, Investing with Principle Can
Pay Off WALL ST. J. (Eastern ed.), June 9, 1999, at 1; Chet Currier, Portfolios With a
'Conscious' Have Big Players Thinking Up New Funds, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2000, at 3;
Danny Hakim, On Wall Street, More Investors Push Social Goals, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11,
2001, at 1:1.
43. See Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate
Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1267-68, 1287-89 (1999); SOCIAL
INVESTMENT FORUM, 2001 REPORT ON SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING TRENDS IN THE
UNITED STATES (Nov. 28, 2001), available at
http://www.socialinvest.org/areas/research/trends/2001-Trends.htm (last visited Dec. 31,
2001).
44. See E-mail from Diane Bratcher, Director of Communications and Planning,
Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility, to Michael E. Murphy, Judicial Attorney,
California Court of Appeals (Nov. 26, 2001) (on file with author).
45. See Social Investment Forum, Introduction to Socially Responsible Investing, at
http://www.socialinvest.org/areas/sriguide/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2002).
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still larger class of individual investors. Many wealthy individuals
place a small fraction of their investments in a socially responsive fund
as a concession to ethical concerns.
Union pension and ethical investment funds are part of the broader
category of institutional investors. In 1999, U.S. institutional investors
held approximately 50% of the domestic market of corporate equities.
Within this sector, 17% of outstanding equities were held by mutual
funds, 6% by insurance company, 2% by bank personal trusts, 2% by
foundations and nonprofit endowments, 14% by private pension funds,
and 11% by state and local pension funds.46
While most institutional investors, especially insurance
companies, private pension funds, and bank trusts, have an unbroken
history of shareholder passivity, some investment funds have more
recently taken an active interest in corporate governance initiatives.
The giant Teachers Insurance & Annuities Association-College
Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF), with over $100 billion in
U.S. corporate equities, has made a sustained commitment to use its
financial clout to promote improved corporate governance practices.47
Similar objectives unite the Council of Institutional Investors, a
coalition of smaller institutional investors drawn from labor, corporate,
and local government pension funds.48
Managers of public pension funds often have an incentive to
appeal to political constituencies and usually tend to take proxy voting
more seriously than their corporate counterparts.49 Some managers are
elected by beneficiaries; in other cases, the managers themselves serve
in state offices or are chosen by elected or appointed public officials.5 °
46. See N.Y. STOCK EXCH., supra note 37, at 59. The figure on foundations and
endowments is derived from NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, supra note 22, at 33. See also
WILLIAM M. O'BARR & JOHN M. CONLEY, FORTUNE AND FOLLY, THE WEALTH AND POWER
OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTING 34 (1992).
47. See TIAA-CREF, TIAA-CREF ANNUAL REPORT 2000, available at
http://www.tiaa-cref.org/libra/AR/00/index.html (last visited December 31, 2001) (gives
total stock holdings of $149 billion but does not provide a breakdown between domestic and
international equities). As of June 30, 2001, the fund had total stock holdings of $137
billion, of which $105 billion were in domestic equities. See E-mail from Thomas Pinto,
TIAA-CREF Public Relations Dept., to Michael E. Murphy, Judicial Attorney, California
Court of Appeals (Aug. 15, 2001) (on file with author).
48. Council of Institutional Investors, Corporate Governance Policies, at
http://www.cii.org/corpgov init.asp. (last visited Dec. 31, 2001).
49. See O'BARR & CONLEY, supra note 46, at 194.
50. See Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance
Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 795, 799-820 (1993).
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The largest public pension fund, California Public Employees
Retirement Systems (CalPERS) with $60 billion in corporate equities,
has long been the standard bearer among public funds in advancing
progressive governance practices and targeting economically under-
performing companies.51 CalPERS published, for example, a 1995
survey of corporate governance practices of the 300 largest public
companies, rating the companies with grades A through F.52  Other
public funds that aggressively pursue corporate governance initiatives
include the State of Wisconsin Investment Board, the New York State
Common Retirement Fund, and the New York City Funds (e.g., Fire
Department, Teachers Retirement, etc.).53
Underlying institutional shareholder activism is the belief that
active monitoring of management performance can improve investment
returns. Although the empirical evidence is inconclusive, it is thought
that an active and independent board will be more likely to discharge
under-performing CEOs, to oppose systemic defects in the corporate
sector, such as the overcompensation of top executives, and to
scrutinize the expected returns from acquisitions and diversification
54programs that may only serve to enlarge the executive power .
Indeed, a study by Wilshire Associates of forty-two companies targeted
by CaIPERS found that the companies beat the S&P 500 share index by
41% during the five-year period in which they were actively
monitored.55
By encouraging active management monitoring, mainstream
institutional investors have pursued a corporate governance agenda that
51. See Zanglein, supra note 39, at 81-82. For California Public Employees Retirement
System (CalPERS) equity holdings, see CalPERS, Asset Allocation, at
http://www.calpers.ca.gov/invest/asset/asset/htm (last visited Dec. 31, 2001).
52. See Ira M. Millstein & Paul W. MacAvoy, The Active Board of Directors and
Performance of the Large Publicly Traded Corporation, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1283, 1290
(1998).
53. See Zanglein, supra note 39, at 70-85.
54. See Millstein & MacAvoy, supra note 52, at 1291-1318; Constance E. Bagley &
Richard H. Koppes, Leader of the Pack: A Proposal for Disclosure of Board Leadership
Structure, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 149, 150-51 (1997); Bernard S. Black, The Value of
Institutional Investor Monitoring: The Empirical Evidence, 39 UCLA L. REV. 895, 898-916
(1992). But see Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law,
Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO.
L.J. 797 (2001).
55. See Zanglein, supra note 39, at 69. The Standard and Poor's 500 stock index,
commonly known as the S&P 500, is a widely used measure of large-cap performance in the
U.S. stock market, which is based on a representative sample of leading companies in major
industries. See Standard & Poor's 500 Index, Standard & Poor's Index Services, at
http://www.spglobal.com/indexmain500.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2002).
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coincides, to a surprising degree, with the preferences of labor union
funds, ethical investors, and social critics of the corporation. The
issues that figure most prominently in the initiatives of large
institutional investors include such broadly supported governance
objectives as confidential voting, cumulative voting, selection of
independent directors, assuring independent board committees,
separating the offices of CEO and chairman of the board, and
eliminating classified boards. 6  The issue of excessive executive
compensation, which has been targeted especially by union pension
funds, also finds a sympathetic resonance among many institutional
investors, though they may favor different solutions.57
B. Dispersion of Shareownership and Shareholder Passivity
The wide dispersion of corporate shareownership in public
corporations offers possibilities for the sharing of corporate power
comparable in some ways to the stake holder model of the German
publicly owned corporation, the Aktiengesellscaften or "AG"
company. 58  If the diverse shareholder constituencies in public
corporations were given an effective voice in corporate governance,
that voice would inevitably introduce new and more complex
considerations into corporate decision making, reflecting the
perspectives of shareholder constituencies outside the present circle of
management. It would, in other words, change the way corporate
decisions are framed by broadening the number of relevant
considerations, leading to pervasive changes in the corporate agenda.
It is, however, paradoxical to speak of the democratic promise of
widely dispersed shareownership because the dispersion of ownership
also divides and fragments shareholder power in a way that paralyzes
shareholder action in corporate governance. The dispersion of
shareownership offers both the promise of democratic reform and an
explanation for shareholder passivity.
56. A detailed discussion of the 1998 proxy season may be found in Zanglein, supra
note 39, at 74-90. See also Romano, supra note 50, at 799-820; John H. Matheson & Brent
A. Olson, Corporate Law and the Longterm Shareholder Model of Corporate Governance,
76 MINN. L. REv. 1313, 1356-59 (1992); TIAA-CREFF, Policy Statement on Corporate
Governance, at http://www.tiaa-cref.org/libra/govemance/index.html (last visited Dec. 31,
2001).
57. See Schwab & Thomas, supra note 32, at 1086-88; Executive PayWatch, available
at http://www.aflcio.org/paywatch/index.htm (last visited Dec. 31, 2001).
58. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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The classic study of the modem corporation by Berle and Means
reveals the deep economic and cultural roots of the dispersion of stock
ownership. 59 As early as 1929, they found that many large companies
had no stockowner holding more than a 2% or 3% interest; and, where
a larger bloc of stock ownership existed, "the most common condition
is that of wide ownership of the bulk of the stock with a substantial
minority held by a single interest., 60 Moreover, income tax statistics
showed "the very great extent to which persons of small or moderate
means must be stockholders of corporations." 6' Berle and Means
found that the wide and expanding market for corporate stock was
generated both by the capital needs of industry and by the cultural
62willingness of Americans to invest their savings in corporate equity.
Moreover, the political history of the corporation has created
legislative and regulatory barriers to concentrated stock ownership. In
an illuminating essay, Mark Roe details how the populist distrust of
Wall Street and financial institutions, shared broadly by the American
public, led to an intricate set of restrictions on banks, mutual funds,
insurance companies, and pension funds that effectively blocked
concentrated stock ownership and kept financial institutions from
actively monitoring management performance. 63 While they did not
promote these restrictions, management interest groups defended them
and threw "their weight in the way of change," knowing that the
dispersion of stock ownership in fact served to preserve management
prerogatives and discretion.64
Today, the wide dispersion of shareownership among institutional
investors reflects in part the regulatory demands for diversification of
investments. The prudent person standard of Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) requires fiduciaries to discharge their
duties "by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize
the risk of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly
prudent not to do so."' 65 The Investment Company Act of 1940 and the
59. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 10.
60. Id. at 48.
61. Id. at 60.
62. See id. at 63-64.
63. See Roe, supra note 11, at 31-53.
64. Id. at 46.
65. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C)
(1994).
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tax rules allowing pass-through of income impose other diversification
requirements, including a restriction on holding more than 10% of the
securities of any one company.66 The widespread use of indexing as an
investment methodology has reinforced this tendency toward high
levels of diversification by calling for statistical sampling of a broad
segment of the market, such as that included in the S&P 500 or the
Wilshire 5000.67
The effects of institutional diversification are compounded at the
level of the small investor, resulting in an extreme level of atomization
that presents obvious barriers to participation in corporate governance.
A person with a self-directed retirement account of $10,000 invested in
the S&P 500 would have only a fractional share, worth an average of
68$20, in any one company. The modest median portfolio value of an
individual investor suggests there is a large population of people with
such small accounts. Even individuals with larger stockholdings have
a tax incentive to include within their portfolio an individual retirement
account (IRA) or a 401 (k) account, both of which are limited in size by
legislative restrictions on the individual's annual contributions.69
At the institutional level, the dispersion of shareownership leads to
the phenomenon of rational apathy. The individual fund manager may
66. See Investment Company Act of 1940 § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(b) (1997) and
I.R.C. § 85 1(b)(3) (West 2001). In general, section 851(b)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code
imposes a stringent diversification requirement on 50% of an investment company's assets;
no more than 5% may be invested in the securities of any one company, and the company
may not hold more than 10 percent of the outstanding voting securities of any one issuer.
With respect to the entire fund of investments, the company may not invest more than 25%
of total assets in the securities of one issuer. Section 5(b) of the Investment Company Act of
1940 provides that an investment company, qualifying for the privileged status of a
"diversified company," must similarly segregate its investments into two asset pools,
representing respectively 75% and 25% of the company's assets, and comply with the same
stringent diversification requirements with respect to the 75% pool: it may not invest more
than 5% in any one company and may not hold more than 10% of the outstanding securities
of any one company. See id.
67. In the late 1990s, index funds received 25% of equity fund inflows. The level fell
to 4% in 2000 and rose to 15% in the early months of 2001. See Stock Index Funds Are
Regaining Favor, N.Y. TIMES (East Coast ed.), June 3, 2001, at 8. The stock index,
commonly known as the Wilshire 5000 provides the broadest index for the U.S. equity
market. See Wilshire Assoc., Inc., Wilshire Broad Market Indexes, at
http://www.wilshire.com/Indexes/Broad (last visited April 23, 2002). For an explanation of
the S&P 500, see Millstein & MacAvoy, supra note 52.
68. This example is offered only to illustrate the possible degree of fragmentation of
ownership in an indexed fund. Indexed funds come in many varieties and may track a stock
index by using sampling techniques without investing in the full range of stocks in the
index. See James A. White, The Index Boom, WALL ST. J., May 29, 1991, at C1.
69. Annual contributions to individual retirement accounts are limited to $2,000. See
I.R.C. § 408(a)(1) (West 2001). Annual contributions to 401(k) plans are limited to $10,000
adjusted for inflation. See I.R.C. § 402(g) (West 2001).
2002]
78 SANTA CLARA LA W REVIEW [Vol: 43
best pursue private self-interest by avoiding the costs of corporate
governance initiatives, where the benefits are uncertain and, in any
event, will accrue to all shareholders.70 Even the largest funds face the
prospect of futility in engaging in shareholder's initiatives. In 1990,
the second and third largest pension funds in the country, CalPERS and
the New York State and Local Retirement Systems unsuccessfully
attempted to intervene in the selection of a new CEO for General
Motors. Although each fund owned approximately five million shares,
each held less than 1% of General Motor's common stock- too little
to entitle them to a hearing.7 1 Despite a mild resurgence of institutional
shareholder activism, more widespread institutional engagement in
corporate governance is unlikely unless the problem of rational apathy
is minimized by keeping costs low and maximizing the benefits of
shareholder activism.
C. Preliminary Legal Obstacles
1. Survey of the Problem
As a logical proposition, the effects of the dispersion of
shareownership can be addressed by either of two options: (1) reducing
the level of dispersion or (2) finding ways for concerted action among
shareholders. The former strategy does not lead one very far. While it
may make sense to relax somewhat the regulatory diversification
requirements,12 a policy encouraging concentrated ownership would
offend financial prudence and traditional distrust of the consolidation
of financial power.
An effective remedy to shareholder passivity clearly must be
70. For a more rigorous analysis of the phenomenon of rational apathy, see William W.
Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory Competition, Regulatory Capture and
Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1861, 1903-25 (1995); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor As Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L.
REV. 1277, 1281, 1284, 1317-28 (1991); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain)
Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L. J. 445, 453-78 (1991).
71. See A. A. Sommer, Jr., Corporate Governance in the 1990s, 59 U. CIN. L. REV.
357, 367, 374 (1990).
72. There is no theoretical justification for limiting investment in a single company to
as low a level as 10% of the company's outstanding securities, as required by the Investment
Company Act and the pass-through provisions of the tax code. Furthermore, the ERISA
standard represents an extreme position by requiring diversification to "minimize" losses,
unless other "compelling" reasons appear. According to a leading text on portfolio theory,
nearly all the benefits of diversification may be achieved with a portfolio of sixteen stocks.
See JAMES H. LORIE, ET AL., THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE. 85
(DowJones-Irwin, 3d ed. 1985).
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sought in concerted action by shareholders. But the most immediate
difficulty is found in the complex federal and state laws that serve to
sanction and preserve the phenomenon of shareholder passivity. It is
not possible to address organizational strategies for concerted action
without first finding a way through this legal labyrinth.
At the risk of over-simplification, I will first discuss three legal
obstacles having particularly direct and immediate relevance to
concerted shareholder action: the barriers to shareholder
communications, the litigation risks entailed in concerted shareholder
action, and the decline of cumulative voting. I will then turn to
organizational strategies for concerted action and finally survey the
array of other legal impediments to shareholder democracy.
2. Proxy Regulation
Regulatory reforms, as is well known, have a way of working
unexpected consequences. Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 gave the Securities and Exchange Commission jurisdiction
to regulate proxy solicitation in the public interest.73 The Act's
sponsors aimed to curb fraud and promote management accountability
by requiring shareholders to be fairly informed about the matters upon
which they were asked to vote. The proxy rules, which the SEC has
promulgated under this statutory scheme,74 unquestionably provide
safeguards against fraud and may foster management accountability in
some contexts, but they also impose costs, delays, and restrictions on
shareholder communications.75
All proxy solicitations must be accompanied or preceded by a
formal proxy statement that meets certain detailed requirements.
Before being disseminated to shareholders, the proxy statement must
be filed with the SEC so as to allow it sufficient time to review and
clear its content. Other public statements relating to shareholder voting
must be filed with the SEC on the day they are made.76 The rules
73. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") § 14(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(a) (1997).
74. See Rule 14, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to 240.14a-101, 240.14b, and 240.14c (2001).
75. See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520,
536-542 (1990); Alfred F. Conrad, Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism?, 22 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 117 (1988); Sommer, supra note 71, at 359, 368; 4 Louis Loss & JOEL
SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 1912-2120.22 (3d ed. 2000).
76. The SEC requires ten days before mailing written materials and five days before a
telephone campaign. See Rule 14a-3, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-3 (2001); Rule 14a-6, 240.14a-
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broadly define the term proxy to include all consents and authorizations
relating to shareholder voting, even a request for money to fund a
shareholder committee. Similarly, a solicitation embraces any
communication reasonably calculated to result in a proxy, thus
including preliminary inquiries to "test the waters" of shareholder
sentiment.77
These SEC anti-fraud provisions are peculiarly misplaced in
elections for the board of directors, which raise issues of personal
qualifications, biases, and policies of the candidates comparable to
those in any other type of election. In other spheres of civic life, the
free expression of opinion is regarded as the best guarantee of truth, but
a person soliciting proxies in an election of directors is at risk of
incurring liability for inaccurate statements. More precisely, the
solicitor may incur liability by making "any statement which ... is
false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits to
state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements
therein not false or misleading or necessary to correct any [prior]
statement.., which has become false or misleading. 78
More fundamentally, management alone possesses the funds to
bear the costs of contacting the mass of shareholders. Under SEC Rule
14a-7, a corporation may refuse to give a shareholder the names and
addresses of other shareholders, provided that it offers to mail proxy
material for the shareholder at the shareholder's expense. 79 In a large
corporation, the costs of solicitation are far beyond the means of all but
the most wealthy shareholders, the chances of success in a proxy
contest exceedingly slim,80 and the possibilities of recovering costs of
solicitation from the corporation close to nil. 8' In theory, the
6 (2001).
77. See Rule 14a-2(f) and (1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(f) and (1) (2001).
78. Rule 14a-9(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(a) (2001).
79. See Rule 14a-7(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7(a) (2001).
80. See Robert N. Shwartz, Note, A Proposal for the Designation of Shareholder
Nominees for Director in the Corporate Proxy Statement, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1139, 1167
n.148 (1974).
81. Upon receiving a shareholder's request for a list of security holders, management
has the option of providing the names and addresses of security holders or of offering to
mail proxy material for the shareholder, at the shareholder's expense. Rule 14a-7(a), 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-7(a) (2001). In most cases, management prefers to make a separate
mailing of the shareholder's proxy material, and charges the shareholder for materials,
postage, and administrative costs. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 75, at 1984-85. A
shareholder will have no grounds to ask the company to reimburse the expense of the proxy
contest if his candidate is not elected. See Royal Business Group, Inc. v. Realist, Inc., 933
F.2d 1056, 1060 (1st Cir. 1991). Moreover, if the shareholder does not gain control of the
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shareholder has the alternative of nominating candidates from the floor
of the annual stockholders meeting. But the annual meetings attract
few, if any, uncommitted shareholders, and management then
possesses enough proxies to nominate and elect its own candidates.
Nominations from the floor, therefore, have no chance of success.
The only exception to management control of shareholder
communication relates to shareholder proposals that are on certain
designated subjects and comply with a prescribed form; if such
shareholder proposals are submitted to management 120 days in
advance of the date management releases its own annual proxy
statement for the shareholders' meeting, management must include the
proposals in its proxy statement and proxy card.82 Since Ralph Nader's
famous "campaign GM" in 1970, shareholder activists have viewed
shareholder proposals as the only realistic avenue to pursue the goals of
corporate accountability. 83  However, the shareholder proposal rule
gives shareholders little power in corporate governance. As Alfred
Conrad observed, "it provides no means of challenging the essential
quality and policies of management. A shareholder proposal can
neither nominate directors, nor express opposition to the management's
nomination. 8 4
3. Litigation Risks of Concerted Shareholder Action
The securities laws create a veritable minefield of obstacles for
shareholders, who wish to act in concert with other shareholders in the
exercise of their voting rights. In most cases, these restrictions
arguably should be narrowly confined to specific problems or abuses,85
but they still create a risk of litigation that effectively chills the right of
board, it may face resistance in persuading the board to reimburse the expenses of a proxy
campaign. There is, however, some authority for the view that the board of directors may
properly reimburse the director for his campaign expenses. See Rosenfeld v. Fairchild
Engine & Airplane Corp., 128 N.E.2d 291, 293 (N.Y. 1955); Stenberg v. Adams, 90 F.
Supp. 604, 607-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
82. See Rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8 (2001).
83. See Donald E. Schwartz, Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections on Campaign
GM, 69 MICH. L. REV. 421, 426 (1971).
84. Conrad, supra note 75, at 155. The proxy rules expressly bar shareholder proposals
relating to selection of directors. Rule 14a-8(i)(8) provides that a company has no
obligation to include a shareholder proposal in its proxy statement "[i]f the proposal relates
to an election for membership on the company's board of directors or analogous governing
body." Rule 14a-8(i)(8), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i )(8).
85. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An
Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 896-903 (1991).
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free association among institutional shareholders. Since these
impediments to concerted shareholder action have been aptly analyzed
elsewhere, it is enough here to indicate briefly the areas of difficulty.
86
Under federal law, the most prominent restrictions fall into four
categories. First, by agreeing to vote securities together for a common
purpose, shareholders may find themselves subjected to the disclosure
requirements of section 13(d) of the Exchange Act, which applies to
shareholder groups that own 5% or more of the stock of a public
company. 7 Secondly, by participating in the selection of directors,
shareholders may be exposed to the insider regulations of section 16 of
the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10(b)-5, which come into play where
shareholders have a relationship with a director. 88  Thirdly, the
principal exemptions of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements
Act of 1976 turn on the acquisition of stock "solely for investment
purposes," a condition that may be inconsistent with active
involvement in corporate governance initiatives.89  Finally, a
shareholder coalition that achieves a position of influence within a
corporation will encounter the manifold problems of corporate control
that pervade the securities laws.
90
86. See Conrad, supra note 75, at 152-62; Black, supra note 75, at 542-60.
87. Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act requires any shareholder group owning more
than 5% of the stock of a public company to make certain disclosures of its investment
plans. See Exchange Act § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1997). The SEC defines the term
"group" to include "two or more persons [who] agree to act together for the purpose of
acquiring, holding, voting, or disposing of equity securities." Rule 13d-5(b)(1), 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13d-5(b)(l) (2001) (emphasis added). The existence of a group may be based on an
informal understanding proven by circumstantial evidence. See Wellman v. Dickinson, 682
F.2d 355, 363 (2d Cir. 1982); SEC v. Savoy Industries, 587 F.2d 1149, 1163 (D.C. Cir.
1978). Thus, shareholders who make informal voting overtures to other shareholders enter
into a hazardous ground in which they may be uncertain of their filing obligation and
incapable of providing the requisite information about the other shareholder's intentions.
88. Section 16 of the Exchange Act requires corporate directors to make reports of their
holdings and to disgorge profits from "short-swing" trades. See Exchange Act § 16, 15
U.S.C. § 78p (1997). The courts have held that a party who deputizes a director to act on its
behalf may itself be treated as a director, making it imprudent for an investor to sponsor a
candidate for the board of directors. See Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 408-09 (1962);
Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 1970); Lowey v. Howmet Corp.,
424 F. Supp. 461, 464. (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Rule 10(b)-5 imposes liability for trading a
company's stock on the basis of inside information. See Rule 10(b)-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5
(2001). An investor who participates in the selection of a director or who allows its own
officer to sit as a director of a company, risks creating a relationship which may be
construed as a conduit of inside information. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,
227, 230 (1979).
89. See Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 § 201, 15 U.S.C.
§ 18a(c)(9) (1997); 16 C.F.R. §§ 801.I(i)(1), 802.64 (2001).
90. A controlling shareholder, among other things, is subject to restrictions in selling a
corporation's shares and may be jointly and severally liable for securities law violations of
the corporation. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 §§ 2, 15, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(I1), 77o;
[Vol: 43
POST-ENRON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The obstacles to concerted shareholder action extend into the field
of state law as a result of the anti-takeover legislation of the 1970s and
1980s. A patchwork of state legislation causes undesirable
consequences to flow from the acquisition of a certain level of stock
ownership--for example, filing requirements, suspension of voting
rights, liability for severance benefits, or disgorgement of profits.
Alternatively, the legislation allows corporations to adopt by-law
provisions, such as "poison pill" stock-purchase rights that dilute
rights of third parties acquiring a large stock interest.91 These state
laws or by-law provisions may bring any shareholder coalition within
their terms where the threshold level of ownership is defined in terms
of voting power. Although the pitfalls to concerted shareholder action
may be unintended, they represent a genuine litigation risk for
shareholder groups seeking a voice in corporate governance.
4. Cumulative Voting
The removal of barriers to concerted shareholder action would,
however, make little difference in the absence of the privilege of
cumulative voting-the right of minority shareholders to secure
representation on the board proportionate to their share ownership.9 z
Exchange Act § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1997). The concept of control is not synonymous
with a majority interest but rather presents a "complex factual question." Kersh v. General
Council of Assemblies of God, 804 F.2d 546, 548 (9th Cir. 1986). A 1989 SEC release
acknowledges the widely accepted view that a 20% stock ownership "in most instances
constitutes control." SEC Release No. 34-27035, 54 Fed. Reg. 30492 n.23 (July 20, 1989).
Control may rest on a group of shareholders voting as a bloc, which has the potential power
to direct management decisions, even if it is not exercised. See Landay v. United States, 108
F.2d 698, 704 (6th Cir. 1939) ("appellants by voting their shares as a block completely
dominated the corporation"). For a definition of control, see Rule 405, 17 C.F.R. §
230.405. See also LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 75, at 1724, citing Arthur Children's
Trust v. Keim, 994 F.2d 1390, 1397 (9th Cir. 1993) and Rochez Brothers, Inc. v. Rhoades.
527 F.2d 880, 890-91(3d Cir. 1975).
91. See Black, supra note 75, at 550-51, 556-60. The term "poison pill" refers to stock
purchase rights distributed to shareholders that become effective upon the occurrence of a
triggering event such as a third party acquisition of a certain percentage of stock. See id.
92. Under cumulative voting, director candidates are elected as a group by rules that
allow individual shareholders to cast all their votes for one or more candidates, thereby
assuring representation on the board to minority shareholders with a requisite number of
shares. The alternative to cumulative voting, "straight voting," involves a separate contest
for each board seat, assuring that a simple majority of shareholders will elect directors to all
vacant seats. See 2 JAMES D. COX ET AL., CORPORATIONS § 13.21 (2001 Supp.). Thus, in
an election to fill nine vacancies on the board, cumulative voting will allow an individual
shareholder with 100 shares to cast 900 votes for a single candidate or distribute the 900
votes among two or more candidates. With "straight voting," the shareholder would have
the right to cast 100 votes for each of the nine vacancies.
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Cumulative voting today is the sine qua non of any scheme to give a
voice in corporate governance to the dispersed mass of shareholders in
the large public corporation. Without cumulative voting, the full board
of directors would inevitably be elected by the shareholders holding a
majority of voting power; with cumulative voting, the membership of
the board can reflect the diverse interests and views of the shareholder
constituencies.
The idea of cumulative voting was an innovation of the 1870
Illinois Constitutional Convention. 93  The practice spread to other
states, which adopted mandatory cumulative voting statutes or
permissive statutes that authorized corporations to adopt cumulative
voting by charter provision or through their by-laws.94 The practice
reached a high point of acceptance in the mid-twentieth century when
twenty-two states had mandatory cumulative voting provisions. A
survey of the 2,900 largest corporations in the 1940s revealed that 40%
offered shareholders the right of cumulative voting.95 The practice,
however, came under attack in the 1960s and 1970s and fell off sharply
in the 1980s. By 1992, only six small states required cumulative
voting, and in states with permissive statutes, a relatively small
percentage of corporations still offered the privilege to shareholders. A
1992 survey of the Fortune 500 companies found that only 14% had
cumulative voting. Among Delaware corporations, only 11% had
cumulative voting.96
Reviewing the decline of cumulative voting, Jeffrey Gordon
reports that the practice was attacked as bringing discord to the board
room, promoting expensive proxy contests, and facilitating hostile
takeovers. The most potent argument was that cumulative voting
created a hostile business climate, causing corporations to prefer to
incorporate in states that did not require the practice.97 Califomia, the
last major state with a mandatory cumulative voting statute, switched
to permissive cumulative voting in 1989, after several large
The practice of cumulative voting involves mathematical complexities, which may
be resolved through well-known algebraic formulas. See Lewis R. Mills, The Mathematics
of Cumulative Voting, 1968 DUKE L.J. 28; Amihai Glazer et al., Cumulative Voting in
Corporate Elections: Introducing Strategy into the Equation, 35 S.C. L. REV. 295 (1984).
93. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look at
Cumulative Voting, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 124, 142-45, 160 (1994).
94. See id. at 143.
95. See id. at 144-45, 160.
96. See id at 145-46, 160.
97. See id. at 146-65.
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corporations reincorporated in Delaware. 98  Surprisingly, cumulative
voting was never subject to persuasive economic objections. On the
contrary, a study of NYSE firms between 1962 and 1982 indicated that
amendments to eliminate cumulative voting rights reduced share values
by an average of 1.57%. 99
The resurgence of institutional shareholder activism in the 1990s
provides a new argument for cumulative voting. Gordon notes that
institutional investors "have little incentive to pursue private gains
because they cannot capture such gains in their compensation. The
strategy that institutions would reliably pursue under cumulative voting
would be to enhance the quality, independence, and accountability of
the board in the hope that this will improve the firm's performance." '00
In this way, he argues, "the benefits of institutional engagement
[would] flow to all shareholders."' 01 In the large public corporation in
which institutional investors own 50% or more of the stock, cumulative
voting would become "a vehicle for virtual representation of
majoritarian interests by a well-motivated minority.' 0 2
In summary, the genius of cumulative voting is that it permits
effective expression of the diverse interests of shareholders. For the
institutional investor, it is a means of enhancing board independence
and improving the monitoring of management performance. For other
minority shareholder constituencies, it offers the possibility of
acquiring a voice on the board by electing a representative director.
With existing patterns of shareownership in the United States, 10 3 it is
impossible to conceive of any effective system of shareholder
accountability for the large public corporation not based on the practice
of cumulative voting. For the purpose of this article's inquiry into the
possibility of self-regulating systems of accountability, the existence of
cumulative voting is an essential assumption.
98. See Susan A. Rose, Comment, Optional Cumulative Voting & Staggered Terms of
Directors: Is the California Climate Warming to Corporations?, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
467, 468-69 (1990).
99. See Sanjai Bhagat & James A. Brickley, Cumulative Voting: The Value of Minority
Shareholder Voting Rights, 27 J.L. & ECON. 339, 353-54 (1984).
100. Gordon, supra note 93, at 171.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See discussion infra Part H.A.
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D. Strategies for Concerted Shareholder Action
1. Limited Deregulation
As a practical matter, the establishment of a general system of
cumulative voting implies a new regime of corporate law, founded on
federal standards, that would most likely be part of a pervasive and
coherent program of reform. I will defer discussion of this subject until
later. It should, however, be noted here that the legal barriers to
shareholder communication and concerted shareholder action could be
removed by a simple process of deregulation, which would chart a
narrow series of exemptions pertaining to the nomination and election
of directors. An exemption to the proxy rules would apply to all
statements and solicitations pertaining to the election of a candidate for
the board, thereby freeing communications in a realm of discourse akin
to the political sphere in which the free flow of information and the
competition of ideas are the best guarantees of truth. 10 4 An exemption
to the legal barriers to concerted action would limit overly broad
statutory language without calling into question the broader purposes
of the legislation underlying section 13(d) of the Exchange Act, insider
regulation, and regulatory consequences of corporate control.
2. Associations of Institutional Shareholders
Assuming the practice of cumulative voting and the elimination of
regulatory obstacles to shareholder communication and concerted
action, it becomes possible to discuss, with a degree of realism, the key
issue of organizational strategies for establishing a system of
shareholder democracy. It is clear that any practical solution to the
problem of rational apathy must begin with institutional shareholders,
who possess the largest holdings. The pattern of dispersed
shareownership imposes insuperable difficulties for organized
104. In general, the filing pre-clearance requirements for proxy statements and other
related material present an unnecessary burden on communications related to election
contests for director, but these requirements may still be justified in one context: the
solicitation of proxies by a major shareholder or outside investor as part of a takeover
strategy. In such a case, there is indeed a need for the elaborate disclosures of the identity
and affiliations of the proxy solicitor. See Rule 14a-101, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101, items 4
and 5 (2001). A policy of deregulation would call for a general rule exempting all
communications (whether among shareholders or between shareholders and third parties)
relating to the qualification of directors or solicitation of proxies for director candidates,
subject to a specific rule applying to the takeover situation.
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initiatives of individual shareholders. However, I will argue, that
institutional shareholder associations could have a representational
function, serving the interests not only of other institutions but also of
the varied constituencies of individual shareholders, thus creating an
effective system of shareholder democracy.
A proposal of Gilson and Kraakman is worth close examination
because it reveals the plausibility of the concept of shareholder
associations for the mainstream institutional investors that might seem
least disposed to engage in concerted action. 105 The authors begin with
a striking assessment of rational apathy among institutional investors.
The growth of investment funds with broad positions in the market,
particularly indexed funds, gives institutional investors the collective
power to monitor corporate performance, but removes individual
incentive for them to do so. The authors argue that the new interest of
some institutional investors in the monitoring of management is
actually misdirected. "[I]nstitutions should not take such an interest
because they stand to gain much less from it than traditional owners
might gain."' 6 The only rational objective of institutional investors
with broad positions in the market is to improve "the corporate
governance system rather than by attempting to improve the
management of particular companies.'
0 7
Following familiar ground, the authors observe that the selection
of independent directors "remains key to any plausible effort to
introduce effective monitoring,"'' 0 8 but argue that it is not enough to
focus on election of independent outside directors. In most cases the
outside directors are themselves chief executives of other public
companies and therefore tend to be ideologically disposed to avoid
active monitoring of management. Moreover, they serve at
management's pleasure, share social connections with management,
and lack any financial incentive to devote time to directorship duties.
109
In short, the outside director is neither independent nor accountable to
shareholders.
As a solution, Gilson and Kraakman propose that institutional
105. See generally Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 85.
106. Id. at 866.
107. Id. at 867 (emphasis added).
108. Id. at 882.
109. See id. at 884.
SANTA CLARA LA W REVIEW
investors collectively establish a "clearinghouse" charged with
recruiting a corps of professional directors that would be accountable to
institutional investors: "To function effectively, the clearinghouse
would merely need to know that institutional investors, out of self-
interest, ordinarily would vote for its nominees, who would be selected
expressly to promote shareholder interests."' 1 The new professional
investor might serve on the board of perhaps six corporations-a role
that would offer enough financial compensation and professional
challenge to attract qualified candidates from business schools,
accounting firms, or management consulting firms."'
The Gilson and Kraakman proposal is impeccably logical as a
solution to the problem of rational apathy. A shareholder association,
engaged in screening and nominating directors, could spread the cost of
shareholder activism and concentrate on the central importance of the
selection of directors in the scheme of corporate governance," 2 largely
eschewing the limited promise of shareholder proposals, which has
been the traditional focus of shareholder activism.' 13 A corps of
outside directors, depending on the support of an association of
institutional investors, could be expected to influence corporate
performance in ways that would reward a modest investment in
membership of the association.
It may be doubted, however, that the financial incentive of
mainstream institutional investors to improve the monitoring of
management is strong enough to prompt such an ambitious collective
110. Id. at 887.
Ill. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 85, at 885.
112. It is elementary that the board plays the central role in corporate governance; it
selects the principal executive officers, evaluates their performance, and approves major
corporate activities. Ultimately, the board alone has the power to effectively monitor
management policy and performance. Commentaries on corporate governance reiterate this
role of the board in similar terms. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Proposed Final Draft),
§ 3.02 (1992); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CORPORATE DIRECTOR'S GUIDEBOOK 4 (3d
ed. 2001); The Business Roundtable, Corporate Governance and American
Competitiveness, 46 BUS. LAW. 241, 246 (1990). On the theory and evolving practice of
actively monitoring boards, see Jill E. Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOzO L. REV.
265 (1997).
113. There have been repeated calls for reform of rule 14a-8 to allow freer use of
shareholder proposals. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 75, at 2051-54. While such
reforms may have merit, shareholder proposals have a limited potential for enfranchising
shareholder constituencies and lie outside of the subject of this article, which explores the
possibility of a representative board of directors monitoring the full range of corporate
activities.
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undertaking. A far more likely catalyst for change may be found
among the institutional investors with the strongest incentive to place
representative candidates on the board of directors-the Taft-Hartley
pension funds, TIAA-CREF, the Social Investment Forum, the
Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, and the public pension
funds with politically responsive leadership. In each of these groups,
investment managers serve a constituency that would be likely to
approve an activist role in corporate governance either on broad social
grounds or to improve the general quality of management monitoring.
It is most plausible to imagine that the sort of clearinghouse that Gilson
and Kraakman imagine would first emerge in these sectors and then
spread through a process of imitation and competition to mainstream
institutional investors, who would also find such a system to be in their
interest.
E. Outreach to Individual Shareowners
1. Procedural Mechanics
The institutional investors who have demonstrated the strongest
propensity to engage in corporate governance initiatives are often in a
position to serve as a conduit of information to a broader population of
individual investors. For example, union members with small
stockholdings may be disposed to follow the lead taken by Taft-Hartley
funds in filling out their proxy cards. Investors in socially responsive
funds commonly possess other larger holdings and, by their investment
in the funds, display a certain willingness to defer to the judgment of
fund managers. TIAA-CREF enjoys great credibility among teachers
who include a significant population of individual investors. The same
can be said of CalPERS and many other activist public pension funds.
Such funds could significantly amplify their influence in selecting
directors by enlisting the support of their constituencies of individual
investors. An effective way to allow the expression of the individual
shareowner voice in the election of directors would be the tried and
tested method employed for shareholder proposals: the inclusion of
alternative choices on the same proxy card as management
recommendations, with an identification of the candidate's sponsors., 14
It would be a simple matter to design a proxy card that would
114. For a history of proposals for mandatory inclusion of shareholder board nominees
in the corporation's proxy statement, see Bratton & McCahery, supra note 70, at 1925.
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identify a candidate for director as being sponsored by a particular
shareholder association and, in the Internet era, to provide a website
where more information could be obtained. Political sponsorship of
this sort is the gist of democracy. People commonly vote for the
candidate of their party or, in local elections, for the candidate
endorsed by a public official they trust. In the same way, a teacher
might reasonably expect a candidate recommended by TIAA-CREF to
reflect the values and interests of educators, particularly if this
assumption could be verified by consulting a pertinent website. For a
union member, the choice may be still easier: a candidate endorsed by
the AFL-CIO, for example, may be counted upon to support the
member's interests as a worker.
Would such a system result in chaos? Not if it were properly
regulated. The privilege of naming candidates on the company proxy
card could be limited to shareholder associations, with a requisite
number of members, which collectively hold a significant share of all
corporate equities, perhaps $150 billion in corporate equities or roughly
1% of the market. As a practical matter, shareholder associations
would have to represent a much larger share of corporate equities to
effectively place candidates, but a higher threshold might impede the
entry of new associations. In light of the advantage of forming the
largest possible shareholder coalition, it is unlikely that there would be
a confusing profusion of nominations.
2. The Distinct Issue of the Large Shareholder
A system allowing shareholder associations to nominate directors
on the corporation's proxy card would not necessarily lead to a similar
privilege for large shareholders in a particular corporation. The
rationale for conferring this privilege on shareholder associations rests
on their representative capacity. With the extreme dispersion of
shareownership, the latent shareholder voice in a particular sector of
the market can find expression only by allowing individual
shareholders to follow the lead of associations representing the
interests of that sector. The issue of giving large shareholders in a
particular corporation access to the proxy machinery rests on entirely
different considerations, beyond the scope of this article.1 15
115. The idea of giving large shareholders access to proxy machinery has its advocates.
See, e.g., MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 117-21 (1976);
Louis LOWENSTEIN, WHAT'S WRONG WITH WALL STREET: SHORT-TERM GAIN AND THE
ABSENTEE SHAREHOLDER 209-11 (1988); George W. Dent, Jr., Toward Unifying
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3. The Potential of Electronic Communication
New electronic technology lends a new degree of feasibility to any
complex institutional undertaking, including a system of representative
shareholder associations.
The threshold problem of obtaining shareholder lists, which has
traditionally burdened proxy contests, can yield to new technologies
that give shareholder associations quicker access to corporate
shareholder records and better data on the holdings of their members
and supporters.' 16  The growing use of the Internet in the securities
industries also offers shareholder associations new ways of enlisting
the support of individual shareholders." 7 In some instances, insurgent
shareholders have already succeeded in making effective use of
websites in proxy contests, despite the restrictions of proxy rules.'
18
With regulatory barriers removed, shareholder coalitions could craft
new systems for communication with their constituencies, including
web sites as well as such devices as newsgroups, bulletin boards, and
online discussion groups. 19 Among cohesive groups of a limited size,
e-mail is an incomparably effective method of communication. It is
widely used today to distribute annual reports and proxy statements to
employee shareholders, 120 and offers a potentially powerful tool for an
organizational network, such as the labor movement, to coordinate
corporate governance strategies.
Ownership and Control in the Public Corporation, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 881, 907-08.
116. For Delaware law on inspection and copying of shareholder lists, see 2 DAVID A.
DREXLER ET AL., DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 27.03 (1987). See also
2 and 3 MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT ANNOTATED §§ 7.20, 16.02 (3d ed. 1993
supp.).
117. Most Fortune 150 companies maintain investor relations websites. See HOWARD M.
FRIEDMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION IN CYBERSPACE, ch. 10 (2d ed. 1998); Steven E.
Bockner & Anita S. Press, Corporate Disclosure Practices in the Electronic Age: The
Website-Opportunities and Pitfalls, WALLSTREETLAWYER.COM, April 1998, at 1. The
SEC has approved electronic distribution of annual reports and proxy statements under
circumstances that provide notice equivalent to paper delivery. See Use of Electronic Media
for Delivery Purposes, SEC Release No. 33-7233, available at 1995 WL588462. The
practice is now growing in acceptance. See Cary I. Klafter & Gregory L. Silva, Moving
Investor Relations Online, WALLSTREETLAWYER.COM, August 1997, at 1.
118. See Gloria Santana, More Corporations Using 'Net to Reach Investors, NAT'L L.J.,
July 14, 1997, at B 16 (CalPERS uses the Internet to solicit support for shareholder proposal
relating to Archer-Daniels-Midland); Karen Donovan, The Web-a Valid Proxy for Proxy-
Fight Notices?, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 26, 1996, at BI (minority shareholder puts spin-off
proposal on website of proxy solicitor); Nell Minow, Shareholder Activists Flock to the
Internet, WALLSTREETLAWYER.COM, November 1997, at 15.
119. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 117, at 10-2, 11-3, 11-11, and 12-1.
120. See id. at 11-6.
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F. Outreach to Indirect Shareowners
1. Procedural Mechanics
The privilege of placing director nominees on the management
proxy card would allow an association of institutional shareholders to
amplify its influence by cultivating a constituency of individual
shareholders, but it would offer only partial enfranchisement to the
broad demographic base of shareholders, who are likely to participate
in stock ownership through self-directed retirement plans and defined
contribution plans.121 A successful system of representative
shareholder associations, however, could also enfranchise indirect
shareowners by a simple procedural innovation-giving indirect
shareowners the power to instruct fund managers to vote for a
qualifying shareholder association. Imagine a corporate sector with
three major clearinghouses engaged in screening and nominating
directors, each officially recognized by the SEC and qualified to place
nominations on management proxy cards. The participant in a self-
directed retirement plan could take advantage of the existence of these
shareholder associations by instructing his fund manager to vote his
holdings in the next year for candidates sponsored by a particular
clearinghouse. The power of giving such advance voting instructions
could be extended to participants of defined contribution plans. 1
22
The mechanics of such a system should not involve any important
obstacles. Fiduciaries of self-directed retirement plans and defined
contribution plans could mail an instruction card with the annual report
including a self-addressed envelope. Although individual accounts
might be small, they would form part of a common fund and would
precisely mirror the holdings in that fund. Thus, if 10% of plan
participants were to instruct the fund manager to vote for a candidate of
a particular clearinghouse, the manager could vote 10% of its domestic
stock holdings for such candidates when they appear on the proxies of
particular companies.
121. NEW YORK STOCK EXCH., supra note 22, at 15, 19.
122. In addition, the right to give such advance instructions could be extended to
beneficiaries of bank-administered personal trusts, presumably with the trustor's
authorization.
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2. Fiduciary Issues
Critics might object, however, that such voting instructions would
impinge on the fiduciary duties of the fund manager. The Department
of Labor has ruled that the fiduciary duties of investment managers of
employee benefit plans include the voting of proxies for corporate
stock, and it makes no distinction for index funds managed according
to a formula to match market performance. 123  Nevertheless,
participants in self-directed retirement plans and defined contribution
plans possess enough indicia of ownership over their stock holdings to
justify a right to direct voting. They bear the risk of the success or
failure of the investments and commonly select their particular fund
from a menu of options. It is consistent with the participants'
assumption of risk in the economic fortunes of the investment to give
them control over voting of their stocks.
In a defined-contribution plan, beneficiary-directed voting would
involve at most a very minor adjustment of the fund manager's
fiduciary responsibility. Unlike the trustee of a defined benefit plan,
the manager is not responsible for satisfying a particular financial
commitment but only for delivering the product that the participant
chooses, i.e., a mix of stock with the desired risk and potential for
growth and income. Moreover, to the extent that the manager relies on
indexing, the manager's fiduciary responsibilities become very limited.
The manager of an indexed fund is responsible only for buying and
selling stock according to an accepted formula to assure a
representative portfolio. The Department of Labor's position that
indexing is irrelevant to fiduciary responsibility rests on a theoretical
level of reasoning removed from the realities of fund administration.'
24
It is true that a plan participant might favor candidates of a
particular clearinghouse opposed by most other shareowners. A labor-
sponsored candidate, for example, might argue for social policies that
other investors might regard as detrimental to corporate productivity.
However, the relevant issue pertains to the functioning of the system as
a whole. The existence of diverse approaches to corporate
performance could serve as a stimulus for more active institutional
monitoring throughout the corporate sector. The presence of the
123. See Interpretive Bulletin 94-2, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,860, 38,862 n.6 (July 29, 1994).
124. See id. at 38,862-38,863.
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dissenting view of a labor-sponsored candidate might lead to a
heightened quality of overall monitoring that would in fact benefit
shareholders of every persuasion.
It is premature to propose a system to give expression to the voice
of indirect shareowners. An effective system of representative
associations of institutional shareholders, with access to proxy
machinery, must first be created. My purpose in pursuing this scenario
is to show that such a system would have the capability of being
extended to the small indirect shareholder at the broad demographic
base of the market.
3. Realistic Prospects
Descending from these speculative heights to the realities of the
securities industry, it is in fact impossible to assess the prospects, or
precise form, of an effective system of representative associations of
institutional shareholders. At some point, the influence of rational
apathy could be overcome by removing obstacles to concerted action
and sanctioning organizational techniques to form shareholder
coalitions. But it would be unrealistic to predict a particular scenario.
The operation of a system of accountability, based on the interests of
shareholder constituencies, would ultimately depend on the strength of
the investors' perceptions of their interests and their willingness to act
in pursuit of these interests.125  The goal of shareholder democracy
must be to open possibilities for the creation of a self-regulating system
of accountability, not to impose a precise model.
G. Further Legal Impediments to Shareholder Democracy
For a system of representative shareholder associations to have a
125. There are a number of organizations in the securities industry that would be in a
position to take advantage of new opportunities to engage in corporate governance
initiatives and might be expected to be active in devising new forms of institutional
cooperation. Among trade organizations, the Council of Institutional Investors demonstrates
the capacity of Taft-Hartley pension funds and public pension funds to act together. The
Social Investment Forum represents the potential activist sector of socially responsible
funds, and the Investment Company Institute serves the mainstream interests of the mutual
fund industry. Among consulting services in the field of corporate governance, the Investor
Research Responsibility Center and Institutional Shareholder Services have a considerable
clientele of institutional investors. In the United Kingdom, the British Institute for the
Promotion of Non-Executive Directors has long assisted businesses in the search for
qualified outside directors. See Michael Beckett, City: Search Is on for the Non-executives,
DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Aug. 23, 1998, at 29.
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fair chance of success, it would be necessary to go well beyond the
matters discussed above. This article's analysis has centered on certain
central problems of concerted shareholder action, but a system of
shareholder associations would flounder unless many other matters
were intelligently addressed and resolved.
1. Nominating Procedures
The attentive reader may have noted that the idea of giving
shareholder associations access to proxy machinery faces a procedural
impossibility. The boards of public corporations decide upon
nominations for directors in an informal and unregulated manner.
Although most corporations have a nominating committee of some
kind, l2 6 shareholder associations would not have a right of access to its
deliberations, but would possess only the foredoomed option of making
nominations at the annual meeting itself. In addition, shareholder
associations would confront obstacles in voting their proxies. State
statutes require shareholders to give advance notice of their intent to
exercise cumulative voting rights so that other shareholders may adopt
counter strategies. 27  An association, seeking to engage a broad
segment of the corporate sector, would face a myriad of moving targets
with separate scheduling and notice requirements.
Without attempting to sketch solutions to these problems, it
should be noted that an effective system of representational voting
would require establishment of a nomination committee, guarantees of
its independence, formalized rules to allow shareholder associations to
place nominations on management proxies, standard notice and
scheduling procedures, and designated representatives to vote valid
126. A 1998 survey found that, among corporations with a market capitalization of $10
billion or more, 93% had a nominating committee; and among corporations with a market
capitalization of $250-500 million, 53% had a nomination committee. See Melvin A.
Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1279 n.70 (1999).
Many of these committees have been formed in the past decade. See Millstein & MacAvoy,
supra note 52, at 1286 n.15. But in testimony before a House committee, Dale Hansen,
CalPERS fund manager, maintained, "Nominating committees all too often are a sham, pure
and simple." ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MNOW, WATCHING THE WATCHERS:
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY 182 (1996).
127. Otherwise, a minority shareholder could gain control of the board by conducting a
kind of ambush. Consider a corporation with 1,000 shares and a ten-member board and two
shareholders, one with 600 shares and the other with 400. If the minority shareholder casts
all his votes for six candidates and the majority shareholder distributes his votes evenly
among all ten candidates, the minority shareholder will gain control of the board.
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proxies.
2. Board Independence
Guarantees of board independence are also needed. A variety of
state laws provide management with an array of entrenchment devices
to thwart a system of shareholder accountability. The most obvious
means of management domination is the well-established practice of
placing executives and other insiders on the board of directors and on
key board committees. 128  Management may also deprive directors of
the means of conducting independent monitoring by withholding
adequate compensation, information, and access to support staff.
While shareholder democracy may ultimately offer the promise of a
self-regulating system, some regulatory push would still be required to
remove obstacles presented by current practices. 129
The effective operation of cumulative voting requires other
safeguards. Under the common practice of classifying the board and
staggering elections over a period of years,' 30 a board of nine members
could be divided into three classes with three year terms that expire on
successive years. Since only three vacancies would be filled in any one
year, a shareholder group would need to get one-third of the votes to
place a single director on the board. A similar result can be achieved
by the simple device of reducing the size of the board. 131 The solution,
128. Though some surveys show that as many as 74% of directors are outsiders, it is
more difficult to determine what percentage actually qualify as being independent in a
meaningful way. Traditionally, most directors are chief executives of other companies, who
have the same ideological bias as management. See Robert W. Hamilton, Corporate
Governance in America 1950-2000: Major Changes But Uncertain Benefits, 25 J. OF CORP.
L. 349, 361 (2000); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 85, at 875 n.40.
129. The American Law Institute adopts the modest rule that a majority of the board
should be free of "any significant relation with the corporation's senior executive" and
defines the term "significant relation" in terms of five categories. AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE, supra note 112, at §§ 3A.01, 1.34. The Council of Institutional Investors
recommends a majority of two thirds of independent directors and defines independence in
somewhat more rigorous terms. See Council of Institutional Investors, Corporate
Governance Policies, at http://www.cii.org/corp_gov init.asp. Ralph Nader advocates a
"purely 'outside' board" with no member who is an executive, attorney, representative or
agent of the corporation. See RALPH NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 126
(1976).
130. Although classified boards have been the target of much criticism and shareholder
activism, a majority of U.S. corporations still have classified boards, in part because
staggering elections are seen to have value as a takeover defense. See Richard H. Koppes et
al., Corporate Governance Out of Focus: The Debate Over Classified Boards, 54 BUS.
LAW. 1023, 1025 (1999).
131. See 2 F. HODGE O'NEAL AND ROBERT THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF
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however, should also avoid an unduly large board. Beyond a certain
size, the board becomes too unwieldy to function as a decision making
body, thereby diminishing the prospects of independent monitoring by
professional directors. 32 For the large publicly owned corporation, the
balance of considerations probably favors nine or eleven members.
3. Other Management Entrenchment Devices
Many other practices contribute to management domination of
corporate governance of publicly held corporations and would
cumulatively frustrate a system of shareholder accountability. A list of
necessary reforms might include the following:'
33
(a) A confidential ballot, seen only by an independent proxy
tabulator. This practice would avoid direct or indirect pressure on those
shareholders who are dependent on the favor of management, including
employee shareholders, investment advisors needing access to
corporate information, and investors that have actual or potential
business dealings with the corporation, such as banks, insurance
companies, and pension fund managers.
134
(b) The principle of one vote per share of common stock. This
principle is an essential predicate of shareholder democracy except in
those situations where a shareholder, or class of shareholders occupies
a stakeholder position in the corporation that is distinct from other
shareholders. Current exchange rules pay insufficient respect to this
principle.
135
(c) Avoid conflicts of interest with respect to voting. The
fiduciary responsibilities of corporate pension fund managers may
often conflict with the pro-manager bias of their corporate sponsors.'
36
Astonishingly, a Department of Labor regulation promulgated in 1994
MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 6.03 (2d ed 1999).
132. See Martin Lipton & Jay W. Lorsch, A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate
Governance, 48 Bus. LAW. 59, 65 (1992) ("When a board has more than ten members, it
becomes more difficult for them all to express their ideas and opinions in the limited time
available. This contributes to the expectation.., that directors are not supposed to voice
their opinions freely and frequently.").
133. Reforms of publicly held corporations should, of course, be accompanied by
parallel reforms of closely held corporations, which account for roughly 20% of corporate
equities. See Eisenberg, supra note 126, at 1286. However, this subject is outside the scope
of this article.
134. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 75, at 1967 n.133.
135. Seeid at 1831-49.
136. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 70, at 1321-22; Rock, supra note 68, at 469-72; Black,
supra note 75, at 596-98.
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allows corporate management to require fund managers to vote proxies
in accordance with statements of the company's investment policies
and to monitor the managers' actual voting of the proxies. 137
(d) The power of stockbrokers to vote shares held in 'street
name, ' 38 though already circumscribed by exchange rules, should be
further curtailed in the interests of shareholder accountability. 39
(e) The proper tabulation of ballots often involves judgment calls
that should be made by independent tabulators appointed by an audit
committee that is itself independent of management. 
40
(f) The establishment of a system of shareholder accountability
would call for a return to traditional rules that scrutinize business
dealings in corporate assets by insiders and protect shareholders from
being forced out of the corporation without their consent.1 41 In recent
decades, the ultimate form of management entrenchment, a buyout of
corporate stock, has gained acceptance on the rationale that it may
resolve problems created by the separation of ownership and control. 1
42
H. The Necessity of Federal Standards
This rapid review of needed reforms serves to highlight a point
noted earlier in the discussion of cumulative voting and state anti-
takeover legislation. State corporation laws raise enough barriers to
concerted shareholder action to assure that shareholder passivity will
continue substantially unchanged. This article's inquiry into the
possibilities of a self-regulating system of shareholder accountability
leads inevitably towards federal standards of corporate governance,
which would preempt the competing standards of state corporation
laws.
137. See ERISA Interpretive Bulletin 94-2, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-2 (2001).
138. Probably 75% of investors keep securities registered in 'street name,' that is, in the
name of their brokers. See MICHAEL P. DOOLEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATION LAW
398 (1995).
139. See J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Shareholder Communication Rules and the Securities
and Exchange Commission: An Exercise in Regulatory Utility or Futility?, 13 J. CORP. L.
683, 704-07 (1988); Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 75, at 2109-2120.4.
140. See, e.g., Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 663-70 (Del. Ch. 1988).
141. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-07 (1939); Voeller v. Neilston
Warehouse Co., 311 U.S. 531, 536 (1941).
142. See David B. Simpson, The Management Buyout: An Idea Whose Time May Have
Passed, 17 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 137, 146 (1993).
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The choice-of-law rule applying the law of the state of
incorporation to internal corporate affairs paradoxically renders the
states impotent to adopt meaningful corporate reform. 143 Management
may evade undesired state laws by the simple expedient of arranging a
merger into a corporation formed in a more hospitable state. In the first
decade of the twentieth century, it was New Jersey, not Delaware, that
enticed major corporations to incorporate under its law. 144 While
serving as governor, Woodrow Wilson believed that New Jersey was
pandering to corporate management and persuaded the legislature to
adopt what he viewed as a more principled corporations code. The
result, of course, was to cause New Jersey corporations to migrate
south to Delaware. 145 The same result would follow today from state
reforms attempting to curb management autonomy. State legislatures
are effectively confined to making minor adjustments into corporate
law or adopting measures favored by corporate management, such as
anti-takeover legislation. 146 In the field of corporate law, an ideological
commitment to federalism is synonymous with defense of the status
quo.
The Supreme Court has expressed reluctance to override
"established state policies of corporate regulation" by an expansive
interpretation of federal securities law, 147 but it has never suggested
that there are significant constitutional limitations on federal power to
regulate corporate governance under the interstate Commerce
Clause. 148 The controversies over the application of sections 14 and 19
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934149 to corporate governance
issues and the presumption of state law by the Williams Act 150 have
143. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, §§ 302-10 (1971).
144. See NADER ET AL., supra note 129, at 44-47.
145. See id. at49-54, 91.
146. For an analysis of corporate charter competition and a proposal for a federally
mandated shareholder right to initiate charter amendments, see Bratton & McCahery, supra
note 70, at 1926-47.
147. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977).
148. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 3 ("To regulate commerce... among the several
States,.. .). See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 18 ("To make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers ....").
149. See, e.g., The Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 411 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Joel
Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common Share, One
Vote Controversy, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 687 (1986); Homer Kripke, The SEC, Corporate
Governance, and the Real Issues, 36 BUS. LAWYER 173, 173-74 (1981).
150. See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 631 (1981); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 86 (1987). The Williams Act, enacted in 1968, regulates cash
tender offers in corporate acquisitions by imposing disclosure requirements and protecting
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turned solely on issues of legislative intent.
It is true that United States v. Lopez, 51 by invalidating the Gun-
Free School Zones Act of 1990, appears to signal a new era of active
judicial review of the limits of the interstate Commerce Clause, but the
decision left intact the lines of authority recognizing congressional
power to regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce 52 and
to regulate activities having a substantial relation to interstate
commerce. 153  Congress might reasonably find that corporate
governance affects both the economic efficiency and the social impact
of enterprises engaged in interstate commerce, as well as the quality of
corporate disclosures in interstate trading of stock. Such findings
would place federal standards of corporate governance well within the
established parameters of the interstate Commerce Clause.1
54
Proposals for federal standards of corporate governance have long
been associated with schemes for federal chartering or licensing of
corporations whereby a corporation's right to engage in interstate
commerce would be conditioned on complying with certain standards
of good corporate governance. 155 The idea has a beguiling simplicity
that has caught the imagination of populist reformers since the
Progressive Era, 56 but it suffers from two defects. First, licensing is a
draconian remedy that would be practically impossible to enforce. A
corporation is either licensed or it is not. If the license of a large
corporation were revoked, it would have drastic consequences on
employees, creditors, suppliers, and customers. Secondly, licensing is
unnecessary as an enforcement tool. Most avenues for sharing
corporate power, which are explored in this article, can be pursued by
amendment of existing legislation, such as the Securities and Exchange
Act and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).
There is no reason to complicate the process of reform by inventing
shareholders' rights to withdraw stock tenders and to receive a non-discriminatory sales
price. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n (d) and (e) (2000).
151. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
152. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941) (upholding the Fair
Labor Standards Act).
153. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1936) (upholding
the power of the National Labor Relations Board to enjoin unfair labor practices affecting
commerce).
154. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
155. See Allen D. Boyer, Federalism and Corporation Law: Drawing the Line in State
Takeover Regulation, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 1038, 1048-54 (1986); Donald E. Schwartz, Federal
Chartering of Corporations: An Introduction, 61 GEO. L.J. 71 (1972).
156. See NADER ET AL., supra note 129, at 65-71.
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new enforcement schemes. In cases where new enforcement tools may
be needed, more traditional enforcement devices, perhaps involving
private enforcement, are likely to be far more effective than corporate
licensing in achieving legislative objectives.
In the end, the enfranchisement of shareholder constituencies calls
for revision of much of the fabric of corporate and securities law. The
process of reform would not involve imposition of a new model of
corporate governance, but rather the removal of anomalies that prevent
the present model from functioning. Each step of the process would
yield some benefits, and even if only partial reform were achieved, the
gains would likely endure. Shareholders who find the means of
expressing their interests within a self-regulating system of governance
would likely not return to the old ways. One may imagine instead that
shareholders would recollect with bemusement the primitive era when
shareholder meetings lasted five minutes and management proxies
offered no choices.
III. SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY AND AN EMPLOYEE VOICE
A. General Policy Considerations
It should not be surprising that a system of corporate governance,
assuring the accountability of management to the shareholders, would
provide new vehicles for expression of the employee voice in the
publicly owned corporation. Democratic norms and procedures can be
put to a variety of uses. But what is the use of introducing the
employee voice, distinct from that of shareholders, into a self-
regulating system of shareholder accountability? There is, of course, a
certain policy justification based on the immense importance of
working conditions to the welfare of society. When jobs lead to
physical or emotional trauma or fail to provide the support for families
or a safety net for illness, disability, or retirement, the public bears the
consequences. Karl Klare notes that "many of the most significant
aspects of the employment relation are determined neither by market
forces, nor by law, but by planning internal to the firm."157 To the
extent that corporations may be induced to take employee interests into
account in such planning, the public would benefit.
But these policy considerations do not explain how the employee
157. Karl E. Klare, Workplace Democracy and Market Reconstruction: An Agenda for
Legal Reform, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 15 (1988).
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voice would serve the interests of shareholders in a self-regulating
system of shareholder accountability. An answer can, however, be
found in the shareholder's interest in establishing institutional
arrangements that support trust between management and the work
force. Trust is more than an ingredient of psychological well-being and
an element of social cohesion; 158 it also plays a part in calculations of
self-interest whenever people with common and conflicting interests
are joined in the same enterprise. This key role of trust in the industrial
enterprise finds support both in game theory and current management
strategies for higher productivity.
Game theorists are likely to perceive elements of the prisoner's
dilemma in activities where conflicting parties chronically achieve
suboptimum results. 159 Labor economist Harvey Leibenstein pursues
this theme in analyzing the relations between management and the
workforce. 160 In his view, productivity is significantly affected by the
quality of performance that workers have discretion to offer or
withhold. 161 The optimum outcome occurs when employees provide
their best effort in exchange for the best compensation that
management can afford. However, this mutually beneficial outcome
occurs only when both parties trust that the other will reciprocate in
kind. 162 In the absence of trust, both management and employees may
calculate that they can achieve the highest individual return by
withholding cooperation and exploiting the trusting behavior of the
other. If employees expect management to offer better wages and
working conditions, they can maximize their utility by accepting these
benefits and offering low effort. In this way, they also protect
158. For a discussion of the elements of trust, see Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust. Contract.
Process., in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, supra note 6, at 185.
159. Although it can take many forms, the following example serves as an illustration of
the prisoner's dilemma. Two confederates in crime are being interrogated in separate
locations. They learn that if both deny guilt they will each receive a one-year sentence-the
optimum outcome for both. If both confess, they will each receive an eight-year sentence-
a distinctly suboptimum outcome. If one confesses and the other denies guilt, the one who
confesses will be released and the other will receive a ten-year sentence. The prisoners do
not trust each other. They calculate that the option of confession may bring a favorable
payoff of release or an unfavorable payoff of an eight-year sentence. The option of denial
may bring a favorable payoff of a one-year sentence or an unfavorable payoff of a ten-year
sentence. Therefore, they both decide to confess resulting in a collective sentence of sixteen
years, as contrasted to a collective sentence of two years that would have resulted from
trusting collaboration by mutual denial of guilt. See ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND
INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 20 (3d ed. 2001).
160. See HARVEY LEIBENSTEIN, INSIDE THE FIRM: THE INEFFICIENCIES OF HIERARCHY
43-59 (1987).
161. See id. at 99.
162. See id. at 53.
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themselves against the possibility that management will renege on its
plans. For its part, management comes out ahead by inducing
employees to offer their best effort while at the same time withholding
benefits. This choice also removes the risk that employees will
respond to improved benefits with low effort. Thus, the pursuit of self-
interest leads to the worst outcome-low effort and low
compensation. 63  Leibenstein reassures us that the game is rarely
played in this pure form. Management and employees develop implicit
conventions regarding the appropriate amount of work and
compensation. In his estimation, however, these conventions usually
lead to an outcome that falls well below the optimal solution for bothparties. 164
Under pressure from foreign competition, American corporate
management has seen opportunities to reduce supervisory costs and tap
employees' knowledge of production methods by adopting a more
cooperative organization of front-line workers, such as that found in
Japan and Europe. In the 1980s and 1990s, there was a rapid spread of
employee-involvement programs that brought workers together with
supervisors and engineers to discuss operational problems and to
design improved work methods.165 In 1994, the United States General
Accounting Office estimated that 80% of Fortune 500 companies had
some kind of employee-involvement program. 66 But this cooperative
model of management presupposes a requisite level of trust between
management and workers, a quality often difficult to engender in an era
of corporate downsizing. Indeed, workers often have reason to treat
employee-involvement programs with cynicism, where the programs
reflect a concealed agenda of cultivating employee acceptance of work
methods that are more stressful, fast-paced, repetitive, and minutely
supervised.
167
The considerations of game theory and employee-involvement
programs are not far removed from perennial management concerns
163. See id. at 48-58.
164. See id. at 52, 77-97.
165. See Shannon Browne, Note, Labor-Management Teams: A Panacea for American
Businesses or the Rebirth of a Laborer's Nightmare?, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 241, 242 (1997).
166. See id. See also Samuel Estreicher, Employee Involvement and the "Company
Union" Prohibition: the Case for Partial Repeal of Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 69 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 125, 127, 134-39 (1994).
167. See Michael C. Harper, The Continuing Relevance of Section 8(a)(2) to the
Contemporary Workplace, 96 MICH. L. REv. 2322, 2357-69 (1998).
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about the consequences of poor employee morale-absenteeism,
excessive workforce turnover, theft, slowdowns, and shirking of
assigned duties. Employers have traditionally sought to enforce
minimum standards not only by monitoring and disciplining
employees, but by encouraging attitudes of loyalty and personal
identification with the firm-attitudes that necessarily involve an
element of trust. In the field of motivational personnel management,
conventional wisdom is frequently congruent with game theory and
new team-management ideas.
Given the importance of a corporation's human assets, the
interests of shareholders will be served by corporate practices that
boost employee morale and validate management-employee trust. 168
After all, worker salaries and benefits usually constitute the bulk of
production costs. An employee voice in corporate governance offers a
direct and honest approach to validating employee trust. It is indeed
difficult to imagine a more reliable means of assuring employees that
their interests will be taken into account in strategic planning and shop-
floor issues.1 69 The European experience with co-determination, most
notably the German Aktiengesellshaften, confirms the business realism
of the practice. 
70
Shareholder democracy, as noted earlier, yields new procedural
vehicles for introducing an employee voice in corporate governance.
My purpose here is to explore these specific possibilities without
entering further into the broad subject of industrial democracy. The
possibilities come under two headings. First, the practice of
cumulative voting and the removal of barriers to concerted shareholder
action could amplify the importance of employee stock ownership as a
168. In a masterful analysis of employee stock ownership, Alan Hyde concludes that
"worker ownership is likely to be highly positive for productivity where local histories of
mistrust prevent workers and managers from concluding cooperative arrangements that
would in fact improve firm productivity." Alan Hyde, In Defense of Employee Ownership,
67 CHI-KENT L. REV. 159, 163-64 (1991).
169. See Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate
Law to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899 (1993)
(providing an excellent guide to relevant socio-economic literature, which advocates a form
of co-determination based on recognition of the board's fiduciary duty to employees); David
Millon, New Game Plan or Business as Usual? A Critique of the Team Production Model
of Corporate Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1001, 1032-37 (2000) (providing insightful comments on
the role of the board in breaking the prisoner's dilemma impasse); Karl E. Klare, The Labor-
Management Cooperation Debate: A Workplace Democracy Perspective, 23 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 39 (1988) (arguing that the goal of worker-management cooperation invites
consideration of genuine power sharing).
170. See discussion supra Part I.
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vehicle for an employee voice in corporate governance. Second, the
formalization of the nominating process for boards of directors-a
necessary detail for an effective system of representative shareholder
associations-offers a radically new possibility for directly introducing
the employee voice in corporate governance, free of the traditional
problems of transaction costs, conflict of interest, and inconsistency
with collective bargaining.
B. Employee Stock Ownership
Employee stock ownership plans, which represent a significant
shareholder bloc throughout a broad segment of public companies,
could potentially play an important role in corporate governance under
a regime of shareholder democracy, but this possibility is restricted by
statutory impediments and the use of the stock ownership plans as an
employee benefit linked to retirement income security. I will discuss
only 401(k) plans and employee stock ownership plans (ESOPS) since
other plans have a minor importance for corporate governance.
171
1. 401(k) Plans
The quantity of employee stock ownership in 401(k) plans
represents a remarkable phenomenon that was seldom noticed before
the Enron bankruptcy. The National Center for Employee Ownership
reports that, at the end of 2000, total holdings of employer stock in
401(k) plans had a market value of $340 billion and amounted to
approximately 19% of the assets of the plans. 172 The holdings appear
171. According to a 1997 survey reported by the National Center for Employee
Ownership, 30% of the 350 largest U.S. corporations offer stock option plans to 50% or
more of their employees, but most employees exercise their options in a same-day buy-and-
sell transaction that gives rise to no actual stock ownership. Ed Carberry, An Overview of
Stock Options, in THE STOCK OPTIONS BOOK 1, 9 (Scott S. Rodrick ed., 1998). Employee
stock purchase plans, which allow employees to buy company stock at a discount and at
prices pegged to specific dates, are more likely to result in some continuing ownership. The
National Center for Employee Ownership estimates that over 15 million employees
participate in employee stock purchase plans, and reports that nearly all the plans are in
publicly traded corporations. But a recent study found that lower-level employees on the
average hold the stock for only about a year. Moreover, it seems likely that individual
commitments to these plans are small since employees purchase the stock by payroll
deductions from their own earnings. There is, however, no statistical data available on this
point. See Ryan Weeden, Ed Carberry and Scott Rodrick, Introduction, in EMPLOYEE
STOCK PURCHASE PLANS 1-9 (Ed Carberry & Scott Rodrick eds., 2001); Ed Carberry &
Ryan Weeden, Recent Research and Case Studies, in EMPLOYEE STOCK PURCHASE PLANS
151-61 (Ed Carberry & Scott Rodrick eds., 2001).
172. See Corey Rosen, Employer Stock is 19% of 401(k) Plan Assets, The National
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to be concentrated in about 2,000 publicly held companies where they
constitute on average a 7% shareholder block. 173
The various kinds of plans qualifying under Internal Revenue
Code section 401(k) have a common feature: they are intended to
provide retirement benefits. The large block of employer stock
represents a departure from the principle of diversification that
otherwise governs retirement benefits. It is, in fact, allowed through a
kind of statutory back door. Section 404(a)(1)(C) of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act requires fiduciaries to diversify "the
investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large losses. ' 174
Applying this principle to employer stock, section 407(a)(2) provides
that the plan may not acquire holdings of employer securities
exceeding 10% of the assets of the plan."'' 75 But sections 407(b)(1) and
(d)(3) generally allow plans to avoid this limitation by expressly
authorizing investment in employer securities subject to certain
restrictions. 176  Section 404(a)(1)(D) directs fiduciaries to discharge
their duties in accordance with plan documents, including the
document provisions authorizing investments in employer securities. 177
About one third of 401(k) plans allow employees to choose
company stock as one of several investment options, but much
company stock in the plans comes directly from employer
contributions.178 For the employer, the use of company stock to fund a
Center for Employee Ownership, at http://www.nceo.org/columns/crl0l.html (last updated
Dec. 13, 2001).
173. The only reliable statistical study, however, is now dated. See Susan Prolman &
Douglas Kruse, Employee Ownership Through 401(k) Plans: the NCEO-Rutgers University
Study, in SECTION 401(K) PLANS AND EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP 9, 13 (Scott S. Rodrick ed.,
1998). The study was conducted in 1995 and relied on 1992 filings of Department of Labor
form 5500.
174. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §
1104(a)(1)(c)(1999).
175. Id. at § 104(a)(l)(C) (1999).
176. See ERISA § 407(a), (b), (d), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(a), (b)(1), (d)(3). Section 407(b)(2)
further restricts the use of employer securities by requiring that an individual account plan
qualifying under section 401(k) meet one of four tests: (1) the investment in employer
securities is at the direction of the employee, (2) the asset value of all individual account
plans maintained by the employer account does not exceed 10% of all the employer's
pension plans, (3) the individual account plan qualifies as an ESOP, or (4) employee
contributions required to be invested in employer securities in the plan do not exceed 1% of
the employee's compensation. See 29 U.S.C. § 1107(b)(i)-(iv) (1999).
177. See ERISA § 404(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a). See generally 1 QUALIFIED
RETIREMENT PLANS §§ 3.33, 16.8 (Michael J. Canan and David Rhett Baker eds., 2002).
178. See David B. Graffagna, Trends and Experience in 401(k) Plans, in 401(K) PLANS
AND EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP 26-28, supra note 173.
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401(k) plan has various possible attractions-for example, a cashless
deduction or a means of cultivating employee loyalty to the company-
but, as the Enron bankruptcy recently revealed, the investment of a
large portion of retirement plan assets in this single, employer-chosen
investment places at risk the employee's assurance of retirement
income.
Such a disproportionate investment in company stock is most
easily justified in plans that offer no more than a supplemental
retirement benefit for employees who are otherwise adequately covered
by diversified plans, but it might also gain a certain measure of
justification if the plan served as a vehicle for an employee voice in
corporate governance. The reality, however, is that the trustee of the
plans usually votes the company stock.1
79
The trustee's power to vote company stock ordinarily lacks any
strong fiduciary justification. Where the employee makes a
discretionary choice of an investment in company stock, the trustee is
shielded from liability and therefore does not have a normal fiduciary
incentive to monitor the investment. 8 ° Again, where the employer
contributes its own stock to the plan, a management-appointed trustee
is likely to exercise a purely clerical role in administering the employer
account that does not call for the exercise of voting rights.
If one accepts the premise that departures from the diversification
principle demand a policy justification, it may be argued that 401(k)
plans should always allow employee beneficiaries to direct the voting
of company stock, thereby offering employees a voice in corporate
governance to compensate for a questionable investment practice.
Such an assignment of voting rights to employees would in fact be
consistent with the fiduciary relationship between trustee and
beneficiary, which places risk (and often discretionary choice) on the
employee. A regulatory rule might reasonably require plans to give
employees voting rights that conform to this fiduciary relationship,
except in special circumstances. 181
179. See Corey Rosen, The 401(k) Plan as an Employee Ownership Vehicle, in 401(K)
PLANS AND EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP, supra note 173, at 5.
180. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act § 404(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)
(1999).
181. In some existing plans, a regulation conferring voting rights on employees might
nullify an explicit reservation of voting rights in an employer's grant of stock to the plan,
giving rise to constitutional objections. Such a nullification of a reservation of voting rights
would enter into constitutionally suspect territory occupied by the Contract Clause, Takings
Clause, and Due Process Clause. Since it would not involve a state-imposed impairment of
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2. ESOPs
Leveraged employee stock ownership plans, known by the
acronym ESOP, account for a somewhat lesser quantity of employee
stock ownership in publicly held companies than 401(k) plans.
However, they tend to represent larger ownership shares in individual
companies-typically holding 5% to 15% of the company stock' 182 -
and potentially offer the most effective vehicle for employee stock
ownership. ESOPs exist under a statutory scheme that sanctions what
could be regarded as a form of pseudo-ownership without property
rights,' 8 3 but they have still been used to give employees a meaningful
role in management.' 84 Although no accurate current data is available,
ESOP assets probably include over $200 billion in stock of publicly
held corporations.' 
85
ESOPs exist under statutory exceptions to diversification and self-
dealing rules in employee benefit law. 186  The enabling legislation
contract or a taking for public use, the precise issue would presumably be analyzed under
the Due Process Clause. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S.
717, 733 (1983). This possible constitutional barrier to regulation would never arise where
the plan itself purchases the company stock.
182. See Corey Rosen, An Introduction to ESOPs, in SELLING TO AN ESOP 7, 13 (Scott
S. Rodrick ed., 1999).
183. For critical view of the ESOP, see William R. Levin, The False Promise of Worker
Capitalism: Congress and the Leveraged Employee Stock Ownership Plan, 95 YALE L.J.
148 (1985); Stanley R. Pietruska Ill, ESOPs: Corporate Advantages Put Taxpayers at a
Disadvantage, 23 W. STATE U. L. REV. 53 (1995); Hunter C. Blum, Comment, ESOP's
Fables: Leveraged ESOPs and Their Effect on Managerial Slack, Employee Risk and
Motivation in the Public Corporation, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 1539 (1997); Ezra S. Field, Note,
Money for Nothing and Leverage for Free: The Politics and History of the Leveraged ESOP
Tax Subsidy, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 740 (1997).
184. See Hyde, supra note 168, at 168-69. For the account of an employee struggle to
establish an ESOP to thwart a hostile takeover, see MICHAEL E. MURPHY, THE AIRLINE
THAT PRICE ALMOST BOUGHT: THE STRUGGLE TO TAKE OVER CONTINENTAL AIRLINES
(1986).
185. The only comprehensive study of employee ownership in public companies, based
on 1990 data, showed an impressive level of employee ownership. For example, 12.5% of
the private-sector workforce then owned stock in companies in which the employee
ownership exceeded 4% of total stock ownership. See JOSEPH R. BLASt & DOUGLAS L.
KRUSE, THE NEW OWNERS, THE MASS EMERGENCE OF EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP IN PUBLIC
COMPANIES AND WHAT IT MEANS TO AMERICAN BUSINESS 13 (1991). During the 1990s,
ESOP holdings shrank somewhat in public companies. Nevertheless, the National Center
for Employee Ownership reports that, in February 2000, approximately two-thirds of a total
of 8.5 million ESOP participants were employees in public companies, and the total assets
of ESOPs and stock bonus plans (including stock in both public and private corporations and
other forms of investment) amounted to $400 billion. See National Center for Employee
Ownership, A Statistical Profile of Employee Ownership, at
http://www.nceo.org/library/eostat.html (updated Apr. 2002); Rosen, supra note 182, at 13.
186. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act §§ 406(a), (b), 29 U.S.C.
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allows employer companies to make a loan, or guarantee a bank loan,
to an ESOP trust, which is used to purchase stock in the company. The
trust holds the stock for the benefit of employees and allocates the
stock to individual accounts as principal on the loan until it is paid off.
Upon an employee's retirement or severance of employment, the trust
distributes the employee's beneficial interest in the trust in either stock
or cash.
87
Since the employer appoints the ESOP trustee, this statutory
scheme allows the employer to give employees ownership rights in the
company without ceding any effective control over day-to-day
management. It is true that IRS tax qualification rules require ESOPs
in publicly owned companies to give employees the right to direct the
trustee how to vote their allocated accounts, and that plan documents
commonly instruct the trustee to vote unallocated shares in the same
proportion as the votes cast by employees.1 88 But these concessions to
shareholder democracy seldom lead to an employee voice in selection
of the board of directors. Employees lack any access to the nominating
process and do not possess the same rights of financial disclosure
enjoyed by shareholders. 89 Their voting ordinarily consists of the
meaningless act of confirming an unopposed management slate.' 90
The use of ESOPs for purposes of corporate governance presents
other problems inherent in relying on a pension plan to achieve
objectives unrelated to retirement income security. The foremost
problem is that of risk allocation. As Alan Hyde observes, most
corporate employees "already are tied to their employer by implicit
long-term employment contracts that leave them with a great deal of
firm-specific and location-specific investment."' 9' Their access to
health care may also depend on employer-sponsored plans. Under
these circumstances, it may not be in the employee's interest to assume
§§ 1106(a), (b) (providing the rule barring self-dealing between employer and plans);
Employee Retirement Income Security Act § 404(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1 104(a)(1)(C)
(diversification).
187. See 1 QUALIFIED RETIREMENT PLANS, supra note 177, at §§ 3.35, 3.36(C).
188. See I.R.C. §§ 409(e)(2), 4975(e)(7) (West 2001); I.R.C. §§ 4975(e)(7), 409(e)(2)
(West 2001); 1 QUALIFIED RETIREMENT PLANS, supra note 177, at § 3.36(B).
189. See James G. Steiker, ESOP Participants and Shareholder Rights, 6 J. OWNERSHIP
EMPLOYEE LAW AND FIN., No. 4, 43, 49-51 (1994).
190. See Department of Labor/Pension & Welfare Benefits Administration Letter (Sept
28, 1995), in RIA PENSION & PROFIT SHARING § 97,500 (2d ed. 2001).
191. Hyde, supra note 168, at 203.
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more risk in the employer's financial future by linking a plan providing
retirement income security, such as the ESOP, to the vicissitudes of
company stock valuation. Analyzed strictly in terms of risk, such an
additional stake in the employer's future will be prudent only if it
yields a compensating job security. 192
Other problems relate to cost and the distribution of ownership
shares among employees. The burden of funding stock purchases may
tend to crowd out spending for other diversified retirement plans as
well as other forms of employee benefits.1 93 In a small but disturbing
fraction of cases, the creation of ESOPs has in fact been associated
with termination of other retirement plans. 194 Moreover, the allocations
to individual accounts are governed by employee benefit rules that may
sometimes generate invidious disparities in employee ownership. At
worst, the plans may foment divisions in the work force by creating
opposing interests among different employee job categories, as well as
between long-term and short-term employees.' 95
In his wise assessment of ESOPs, Alan Hyde concludes that,
despite this problematic linking of ownership and employee benefits,
ESOPs can sometimes serve the interests of both management and
workers by building mutually beneficial relationships of trust. But he
suggests that ESOPs often make most the sense if "layered on top of"
other retirement and health security plans so as to better "decouple
employee ownership from retirement and health security."',
96
The type of beneficial relationship of trust that Hyde envisions
could be more easily achieved in a regime of shareholder democracy.
By conferring on ESOP beneficiaries the right of cumulative voting
and free association with other shareholders, it would be possible to
reduce the size of ESOPs without loss of their influence in corporate
governance. Smaller ESOPs, with more effective shareholder rights,
192. The tax qualification rules have certain features to mitigate the element of risk.
Most notably, as long-term employees fifty-five years and older approach retirement, they
can direct the trustee to diversify, in annual increments, up to 50% of their accounts. See
I.R.C. § 401(a)(28) (West 2001). But while it serves a prudent purpose, the diversification
rule works directly contrary to the objective of corporate governance by reducing the voting
rights of the senior employees who have the greatest stake in the company.
193. See Michael E. Murphy, Finding the Cheese: Through the Maze of Employee Stock
Ownership, 56 GUILD PRAC. 169, 171, 177-78 (1999).
194. See Field, supra note 183, at 84; Rosen, supra note 179, at 14.
195. See William H. Simon, The Prospects of Pension Fund Socialism, 14 BERKELEY J.
OF EMP. & LAB. L. 251, 259-64 (1993).
196. Hyde, supra note 168, at 208.
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could provide an employee voice without seriously distorting a prudent
employee benefit structure.
3. Shareholder Associations and Employee Ownership
In theory, the existence of minority blocs of employee
shareholders could amplify the democratizing effect of shareholder
accountability. Unencumbered by regulatory restrictions, shareholder
associations of institutional investors could solicit the votes of
employee shareholders for particular director candidates, using
telephones, websites, and interactive electronic communication to
contact potential supporters. For their part, employee shareholders
could form organized shareholder associations that would themselves
select director candidates or join in coalitions with other shareholder
associations for that purpose. Directors elected by employee
shareholders, or by coalitions including employee shareholders, would
presumably be attentive to the interests of their employee constituents.
This scenario, however, presupposes further legislative reform.
Both 401(k) plans and ESOPs function under legislative schemes that
are poorly adapted for corporate governance. It would be necessary to
recast extensively the statutory framework for these plans before they
could offer employees a role in corporate governance commensurate
with the employees' actual ownership interests in the corporation.
C. The Nominating Process
In the contemporary corporation, where the management slate for
the board of directors goes unopposed, it is obvious that the process of
nominating directors is a more important matter than the conduct of the
election itself. Yet, while the voting for the unopposed management
candidates is minutely regulated by statute, SEC regulations, and by-
laws, the nominating process itself is conducted in an informal and
unregulated manner within a closed circle of top executives. Although
large publicly owned corporations are very likely to form nominating
committees, 197 the committees unfortunately lack any guarantee of
independence or democratic norm for action.
A system of representative shareholder associations, as noted
197. See supra text accompanying note 126.
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earlier, could not operate effectively without formalizing the
nominating process by requiring independent nominating committees,
subject to certain defined duties and procedures. Such a formalization
of the nominating process would offer a distinct opportunity of
potentially immense importance. It could provide a forum for the
expression of the employee voice in corporate governance, steering a
wide berth from the reefs and shoals traditionally afflicting employee
participation in management-namely, incompatibility with collective
bargaining, lack of professionalism, transactional costs of collective
decision making, and conflicts of interest.
An employee voice in the nominating process for the board of
directors would not interfere, directly or indirectly, with the subjects of
collective bargaining (i.e., wages and working conditions). Nor would
it usurp the role of union representatives as exclusive intermediaries
between management and the workforce with respect to all matters
affecting collective bargaining or require an infrastructure that might
be regarded as a management-dominated labor organization violating
section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act. 198 In fact, it might
even help to create a corporate culture more congenial to union
representation by conditioning management to consider employee
interests in strategic and shop-floor planning.
Employee participation in the nominating process would avoid a
criticism of direct employee membership on the board-that employees
lack the specialized expertise to serve on the board and can therefore be
out-maneuvered or ignored. 199 A more active nominating committee
would most likely widen the field of prospective director candidates
without necessarily decreasing professional qualifications. With the
benefit of employee input, the nominating committee could look for
candidates with the sophistication to factor employee interests into
complex corporate strategies.
This avenue for expression of the employee voice would also steer
wide of the potentially debilitating costs of collective decision making.
According to Henry Hansmann, these costs are the critical factor in
determining the prospects of worker ownership in business enterprises
198. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C § 158(a)(2) (1999).
199. See, e.g., Robert John Schulze, Note, Can This Marriage Be Saved? Reconciling
Progressivism with Profits in Corporate Governance Laws, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1607, 1614
(1997).
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and vary with the homogeneity of the workforce. 200  He argues that
where workers are highly homogeneous, as in law firms or small
plywood mills, the costs of collective decision making are minimized
and worker ownership often succeeds. However, where the workforce
has any substantial degree of heterogeneity, the problems of collective
decision making prove fatal to the practice of worker ownership. Such
heterogeneity is always found in the large publicly owned corporation
where employee groups not only have conflicting interests but also
disparate skills, information, and privileges.
Hansmann acknowledges, however, one case that defies his
generalizations-the phenomenal success of the Mondragon
cooperatives in the Basque region of Spain, which have grown from a
single workers' cooperative with twenty-three members in 1956 to a
federation of cooperatives engaged in manufacturing, retail
distribution, and financial services with sales of approximately $7
billion.2 0 ' He argues unpersuasively that the Mondragon cooperatives
are managerial in nature and therefore are not a true form of employee
ownership 2 In fact, the Mondragon cooperatives reflect a triumph of
intelligent institutional design, which avoids the debilitating costs of
collective decision making while preserving ultimate accountability of
management to the workforce. A key feature of the system is that
workers possess the right to select the entire board of directors, but the
board and management then enjoy an opportunity to succeed or fail
within their prescribed terms of office. 203
The lesson to be gained from the Mondragon experience is that
200. See generally Henry Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs,
Law Firms, Codetermination, and Economic Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1749 (1990).
201. See Mondragon Corporacion Cooperativa, MCC, A Message from the President, at
http://www.mondragon.mcc.es/ingles/mensaje.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2002) (indicating a
sales figure that refers to industrial and distribution activities).
202. See Hansmann, supra note 200, at 1790-94. In a careful critique of Hansmann's
thesis, Allen Hyde extends the list of exceptions beyond the case of the Mondragon
cooperatives and concludes that "genuine employee-owned businesses succeed in almost
any imaginable industry, with all types of employees." Hyde, supra note 168, at 168.
203. Directors are directly elected by employees to staggered terms of four years at an
annual meeting of the workforce. Usually, the selected candidates are employees in
supervisory positions or with specialized skills. The board hires management employees
under four-year contracts. In day-to-day operations, workers interact with management
through social councils representing particular employee groups. Although the social
councils have only advisory power, they work with executives who must ultimately
vindicate themselves to employee representatives on the board to secure renewal of their
employment contracts. See WILLIAM FOOTE WHYTE & KATHLEEN KING WHYTE, MAKING
MONDRAGON: THE GROWTH AND DYNAMICS OF THE WORKER COOPERATIVE COMPLEX
35-38, 235 (1991); GREG MACLEOD, FROM MONDRAGON TO AMERICA: EXPERIMENTS IN
COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 28-30 (1997).
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employees can exercise defined rights to select the board of directors
without incurring the fatal transaction costs of collective decision-
making. This lesson can be easily applied to the institutional design of
an employee voice in the publicly owned corporation. By allowing
employees to participate in the nominating process for the board,
employees can gain a genuine degree of influence within the
corporation, without subjecting the corporation to the transaction costs
often associated with an employee role in management.
In a system of employee participation in the nominating process,
the problems of conflict of interest between employer and employee
could also be reduced to manageable proportions, if not eliminated. °4
The sort of direct conflict that occurs when an employee director votes
on matters affecting employee jobs could be avoided by the simple
expedient of drawing employee candidates from outside the workforce,
but the matter of employee access to information presents a more
intractable problem that demands a kind of balancing act. On the one
hand, an important reason for creating an employee voice in
management is to facilitate the flow of information to the workforce. It
is the disparity in information between management and workers that
can undermine trust and cause employee-involvement schemes to go
awry.2°5 But a general policy of confidentiality is probably a necessary
condition for effective board deliberations in today's business culture.
Rules that would destroy this confidentiality can be expected only to
drive the real locus of decision-making away from board meetings into
informal caucuses of directors and executives.
The dilemma regarding disclosure of management information
could again be negotiated, under favorable conditions, by reaching
outside the workforce to choose employee candidates for the board.
Employee-nominated directors will know that they must exercise
discretion to maintain working relationships with other directors and
management. Since the nature of the director's role would inevitably
favor a balancing of his working relationship with management and the
desires of employee constituents, the director is likely to be amenable
to following reasonable conventions allowing limited disclosure. If the
nominating committee should nevertheless choose an employee as
director, it would have to either live with the inevitable conflict of
204. See Michael E. Murphy, Workers on the Board. Borrowing a European Idea, 27
LAB. L.J. 751, 754-56 (1976).
205. See O'Connor, supra note 169, at 93d-40, 961-62.
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interest or work out a stipulation for the employee-director's conduct
on the board.2 °6
The mechanics of employee participation in the nominating
process can be easily devised and might take many forms. Charles
Craver advocates a system modeled after European co-determination
that would assure employee representatives one-third to one-quarter of
available board positions. 20 7 I will sketch a much more modest and
conservative scheme. My purpose is not so much to advocate this
particular solution as to demonstrate the possibility of avoiding the
dilemmas presented by collective bargaining, transaction costs, and
conflicts of interest.
Imagine that, under conditions of shareholder democracy, the
board would reflect the differing perspectives of shareholder
constituencies. The nominating committee might include four directors
reflecting the same diversity. The fifth member of the committee
might be an employee representative, endowed with full voting rights
but without actual membership on the board. Although potentially
outvoted, the employee member could effectively advocate particular
candidates by exploiting management's desire to maintain a reputation
of fairness in the workforce and by bargaining with other members of
the committee who would themselves have differing preferences.
Federal regulations might require companies to adopt by-laws
choosing one of several options for selecting the employee
representative on the nominating committee. Companies with high
union membership might choose the representative through collective
bargaining units. Companies with employee stock ownership plans
might adopt some method of polling employee-owners. Other
companies might be authorized to choose the employee representative
through a system of employee councils, modeled after the European
works councils, a system which has been vigorously advocated for the
2081 0United States, or some other form of employee association. 2°9
206. See Murphy, supra note 204, at 761.
207. See Charles B. Craver, Mandatory Worker Participation Is Required in a Declining
Union Environment to Provide Employees with Meaningful Industrial Democracy, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 135, 164-68 (1997).
208. See PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW 283-95 (1990); Joel Rogers & Wolfgang Streeck, Workplace
Representation Overseas: The Works Councils Story, in WORKING UNDER DIFFERENT
RULES, 97-156 (Richard B. Freeman ed., 1994).
209. There are many models to choose from, including a cooperative employee
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Finally, companies might have the option of devising another method
of selection subject to regulatory approval.
Variations on this scheme or Craver's more ambitious proposal
can easily be envisioned.10 My point in elaborating this scenario is to
show that employees can be given a direct voice in corporate
governance through the nominating process with virtually no downside
risk to unions or shareholders.
IV. THE CORPORATION AND THE COMMUNITY GENERALLY
A. Fiduciary Issues
The broad topic of the relation between the corporation and the
community plainly leads outside the sphere of corporate governance
and calls for consideration of external controls, such as government
regulation, taxation, and lawsuits, addressing a myriad of distinct issues
from public health to consumer protection.211 Nevertheless, since the
famous exchange between Dodd and Berle in the Harvard Law
Review, 212 a much-contested school of thought has insisted that
management's fiduciary duties extend to constituencies other than
shareholders. These expansive views of management's fiduciary
responsibility have usually been associated with the idea of stakeholder
entitlements, giving suppliers, customers, creditors, and affected
groups in the community a right to be considered in corporate decision
making, and have led to what is known, at least to its detractors, as the
"multi-fiduciary model" of managerial responsibility.21 3
Critics object that, for all its ethical good intentions, the
stakeholder concept can have the practical effect of sanctioning
association at Filene's Department Store in Boston devised by Justice Louis Brandeis early
in his career. See ALPHEUS T. MASON, BRANDEIS, A FREE MAN'S LIFE 147 (1946).
210. See Craver, supra note 207 and accompanying text.
211. See Alfred F. Conrad, Reflections on Public Interest Directors, 75 MICH. L. REV.
941, 946, 960 (1977); Schulze, supra note 199, at 1642.
212. See Dodd, supra note 20, at 1145; Adolf A. Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers
Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932).
213. See, e.g., Ronald M. Green, Shareholders as Stakeholders: Changing Metaphors of
Corporate Governance, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1409, 1419 (1993); Wai Shun Wilson
Leung, The Inadequacy of Shareholder Primacy: A Proposed Corporate Regime that
Recognizes Non-Shareholder Interests, 30 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 587, 620-24 (1997);
Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a
Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189, 1252-53 (1991). For
an interpretation of stakeholder statutes, see Gary van Stange, Note, Corporate Social
Responsibility Through Constituency Statutes: Legend or Lie?, II HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 461
(1994); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing
Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579 (1992); David Millon, Redefining
Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223 (1991).
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managerial irresponsibility.1 4 It may be so difficult to enforce complex
and conflicting fiduciary duties to multiple stakeholders that such
multiple duties may actually encourage managerial discretion and
autonomy. It was this consideration that Adolf Berle ultimately found
to be decisive.21 5  It is seldom noted that a concluding passage in
Berle's famous study, coauthored by Means, comes close to espousing
a fiduciary duty toward the community.21 6 But Berle soon thereafter
rejected this view in his debate with Merrick Dodd and maintained
instead that an effective system of accountability called for clearly
defined fiduciary duties.21 7
There is, however, a middle ground avoiding the pitfalls of the
multi-fiduciary model, which is suggested by the Delaware takeover
litigation. In the Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. decision, the
Delaware Supreme Court stated that a defensive measure to defeat a
takeover must be analyzed in terms of the threat posed to "the
corporate enterprise. '21 8 Valid concerns might include "the impact on
'constituencies' other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers,
employees, and perhaps even the community generally.) 219 In the
later Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. decision, the
court explained that "[a] board may have regard for various
constituencies in discharging its responsibilities, provided there are
rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders.,
220
The Unocal and Revlon decisions reflect the common sense view
that a corporation needs to have good relations with those on whom it
depends for its long-term success. These include not only employees,
creditors, and suppliers, but also those in the general community that
have the capacity to influence government policies affecting the
corporation and the goodwill of its customers. This principle can
logically be extended to the health of the environment since
environmental sustainability is a necessary condition for long-term
214. See Schulze, supra note 199, at 1612; Rima Fawal Hartman, Note, Situation-
Specific Fiduciary Duties for Corporate Directors: Enforceable Obligations or Toothless
Ideals?, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1761, 1763 (1993).
215. See Berle, supra note 212, at 1367-69.
216. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 10, at 312.
217. See Berle, supra note 212, at 1367-69.
218. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
219. Id.
220. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986).
SANTA CLARA LA W REVIEW
business survival.22
In recent years, this broad understanding of management's
fiduciary responsibility has entered securely into business
consciousness. In an official guideline on corporate governance, The
Business Roundtable, an association of chief executive officers of
major corporations, stated that a fiduciary duty to shareholders can be
reconciled with consideration of the interests of other stakeholders:
It is in the long-term interests of stockholders for a corporation to
treat its employees well, to serve its customers well, to encourage
its suppliers to continue to supply it, to honor its debts, and to have
a reputation for civil responsibility. Thus, to manage the
corporation in the long-term interests of the stockholders,
management and the board of directors must take into account the
interests of the corporation's other stakeholders.
222
To the extent that management's fiduciary duty extends to matters
affecting the interests of the larger community, this duty becomes a
factor in the success of shareholder initiatives pertaining to these
interests. A modest amount of shareholder pressure may be enough to
prompt action that comports with management's fiduciary duty. To
explore this point, I will turn to the subjects of social reporting, foreign
contracting, and corporate political involvement.
B. Social Reporting
Among the various directions of the debate over management's
fiduciary responsibilities, the matter of disclosure bears a particularly
close relationship to the subject of this article-shareholder democracy.
Although disclosure is designed for the protection of investors, its chief
value often lies in its impact on corporate governance.223 By
assembling data for disclosure to shareholders, management is forced
to confront business realities and incorporate them into its decision-
making. Louis Lowenstein observes that, apart from informing
221. See infra discussion Part IV.B.I.
222. BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 3 (Sept.
1997). For similar statements, see AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 112, at § 2.01(a);
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 112, at 5.
223. See generally Louis Lowenstein, Financial Transparency and Corporate
Governance: You Manage What You Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1335 (1996); Merritt B.
Fox, Required Disclosure And Corporate Governance, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., No.3,
113 (1999).
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investors, financial disclosure may have "the quite independent effect
of forcing managers to confront disagreeable realities in detail and
early on."224 Disclosure may serve precisely the same function with
respect to the long-term social and environmental impacts of the
corporation's activities, which managers may be inclined to deny or
eschew in favor of short-term objectives.
1. Environmental Reporting
Under favorable circumstances, disclosure may prompt
management to devote imagination, energy, and systematic attention to
matters that would otherwise be ignored. The creative potential of
disclosure has particular relevance to the long-term interdependencies
between the corporation and environmental sustainability. 225  As a
personal illustration, my grandfather, Michael Flatley, was a small-
town doctor in Antigo, Wisconsin, not far from Wisconsin Rapids, the
site of a flourishing specialty paper company known as Consolidated
Paper. Before his death, he had invested enough of his savings in
Consolidated Paper to pay for the college education of three
generations of his descendants. Two years ago, Consolidated Paper
was acquired by Stora Enso, a Finnish paper company with $13 billion
in sales and operations in several European countries.2 26
As a new Stora Enso shareholder, I received last year, with the
corporation's 2000 annual report, a separately bound 40-page
environmental report, verified by a European division of Price
Waterhouse, which measured environmental impacts in five areas:
wood procurement, energy use, waste management, recycled fiber use,
and transport.227 In each area, the data for the year 2000 revealed
significant improvement over the preceding year. An already high use
of biofuels increased from 62 to 64% of total fuel consumption in
228production. Despite a 4% increase in pulp, paper, and board
224. Lowenstein, supra note 223, at 1342.
225. See Daniel J. Fiorino, Rethinking Environmental Regulation: Perspectives on Law
and Governance, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 441, 445-50 (1999); Bradley C. Karkkainen,
Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor
to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L. J. 257 (2001).
226. See Stora Enso, Stora Enso's History, at
http://www.storaenso.com/CDAvgn/main/0,, I_-2083--,00.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2002).
227. See STORA ENSO Co., ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT (2000), available at
http://www.storaenso.com/CDAvgn/showDocument/0,,1279,00.pdf (last visted Nov. 11,
2002).
228. See id. at 2.
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production, the company experienced reductions, in absolute quantities,
of waste disposal (3%), atmospheric emissions of sulfur dioxide, (4%)
and nitrogen oxides (5%), and water pollution-whether measured by
chemical oxygen demand (2%), or by the presence of organic
compounds containing chlorine (4%) or nitrogen (4%).229 Water
pollution by phosphorus compounds increased 2% in absolute terms,
while decreasing slightly on a unit of production basis. Stora Enso
facilities accounting for 80% of production also prepared site-specific
audits conforming to the European Eco-Management and Audit
Scheme (EMAS) or the ISO 14001 system sponsored by the
International Organization for Standardization. 230  The environmental
report listed addresses where shareholders could order the EMAS
reports and expressed a commitment to complete an environmental
audit of the former Consolidated Paper operations by the end of the
year 2002.
When Consolidated Paper was acquired by Stora Enso, it clearly
entered into a quite different universe of corporate decision-making,
which systematically took environmental goals into account in business
planning. The announced objective of the EMAS reporting standards
is "to promote continuous improvement in the environmental
performance of industrial activities. '231 In the case of Stora Enso, this
objective appears to be satisfied.
On this side of the Atlantic, the practice of environmental
reporting lags well behind the level of acceptance it enjoys in the
European Union.232 Many American companies complain that such
reporting places them at risk of disclosing liabilities or assembling
discoverable caches of documents for potential plaintiffs.233
Nevertheless, environmental reporting has made some important
inroads.3 The Toxics Release Inventory program, which requires
229. See id.
230. See id. at 12.
231. Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1290 (1995).
232. For a history of the EMAS reporting system and assessment of its prospects, see
Orts, supra note 231, at 1290-1312. For background on the parallel, but somewhat less
stringent, reporting system of the International Organization for Standardization, see Naomi
Roht-Arriaza, Shifting the Point of Regulation: The International Organization for
Standardization and Global Lawmaking on Trade and the Environment, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q.
479, 502-518 (1995).
233. See Linda Richenderfer & Neil R. Bigioni, Going Naked Into the Thorns:
Consequences of Conducting an Environmental Audit Program, 3 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 71
(1992); Terrell E. Hunt & Timothy A. Wilkins, Environmental Audits and Enforcement
Policy, 16 HARV. ENVTL L. REV. 365 (1992).
234. See Joel Makover, The Power of Ten, GREEN BUSINESS LETTER (June 2001) at 3
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industrial firms to disclose releases of 654 specified toxic chemicals, is
widely given much of the credit for reducing these toxic releases by
almost half since 1987.235 The EPA officially encourages
comprehensive environmental reporting236 and has enlisted thousands
of firms in an array of voluntary programs that may entail certain
reporting duties. 237  A private group dedicated to environmental
auditing and disclosure, the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible
Economies (CERES) now counts some fifty companies among its
members, including several major corporations. 238
The goal of encouraging a proactive corporate policy of
environmental self-evaluation requires consideration of incentives and
disincentives that are outside the scope of this article, 239 but one
important point is relevant here: pressure from within the processes of
corporate governance, generated by minority shareholders, can lend a
significant, and perhaps even decisive, impetus to the faltering
development of environmental reporting in this country. It is safe to
say that most Americans would favor the level of environmental
responsibility displayed by European reporting practices. The
enfranchisement of minority shareholders, outlined earlier in this
article, would help to bring this popular preference to bear on the
nomination and selection of directors. While one cannot predict a
precise scenario, it is worth noting again that environmentally
committed institutional investors in the field of ethical investing are
large enough to play a catalytic role in forming shareholder coalitions.
Even the best designed scheme for environmental reporting would
be clouded by imponderables but if necessary, it would be possible to
and 8, available at http://www.GreenBizLetter.com.
235. See Karkkainen, supra note 225, at 286-88; John W. Maxwell, et al., Self-
regulation and Social Welfare: The Political Economy of Corporate Environmentalism, 43
J.L. & EcON. 583, 604 (2000).
236. See Environmental Protection Agency, Environmental Auditing Policy Statement,
51 Fed. Reg. 25,004 (July 9, 1986) and Environmental Protection Agency, Voluntary
Environmental Self-Policing and Self-Disclosing Interim Policy Statement, 60 Fed. Reg.
16,875 (April 3, 1995).
237. See Julio Videras & Anna Alberini, The Appeal of Voluntary Environmental
Programs: Which Firms Participate and Why?, 18 CONTEMP. ECON. POL'Y 449, 551
(2000).
238. See Orts, supra note 231, at 1289; CERES, About Us, Who's in the Network, at
http:// www.ceres.org/about/main.htm (last visited December 4, 2001).
239. See, e.g., Eric W. Orts & Paula C. Murray, Environmental Disclosure and
Evidentiary Privilege, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (1997); David Hess, Social Reporting: A
Reflexive Law Approach to Corporate Social Responsiveness, 25 J. CORP. L. 41 (1999);
Heather L. Cook & Robert R. Hearn, Note, Putting Together the Pieces: A Comprehensive
Examination of the Legal & Policy Issues of Environmental Auditing, 7 TUL. ENVTL. L.J.
545 (1994).
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strengthen the hand of minority shareholders who desire such
reporting. Cynthia Williams suggests the alternative of an opt-in
system of social reporting whereby a certain percentage of shareholders
could demand management to institute a program of auditing and
disclosure on a particular subject.240 In the context of cumulative
voting, the percentage might be set at the number of shareholders
capable of electing a single director of a board of minimum size. An
opt-in system of environmental reporting would rely on a sponsoring
director, or a sponsoring coalition of shareholders, to monitor
management's commitment to the program. Though involving an
element of compulsion, it might still promote the sort of systematic and
reflective search for environmental improvement that is the
desideratum of environmental reporting.
2. Reporting of Family-Support Practices
A shareholder-driven system of social reporting could be an
effective means of dealing with other social concerns that enjoy
widespread public attention and affect matters within the scope of
management's fiduciary duties. I will confine my comments to a
subject of great potential interest not only to social investors but also to
labor pension funds-family-support practices. In this area, there is in
fact a strong case for a mandatory rather than voluntary system of
reporting, but in either case, the monitoring of the disclosures by an
organized shareholder bloc would help assure that the reporting would
inform actual corporate decision-making.
In the past forty years, the historic increase in families with single
parents or two working parents has created new pressures and obstacles
for balancing workplace demands and family life.24' In an extensive
nationwide poll, Sylvia Hewlett and Cornel West found that 90% of
working parents would like access to compressed work weeks,
flextime, job-sharing, and benefits for part-time work; 87% favored a
"law guaranteeing three days of paid leave annually for child-related
responsibilities such as attending a parent-teacher conference or taking
a child to the dentist;" and 71% wanted legislation allowing workers
"to trade two weeks' pay for an extra two weeks of vacation time per
year.1
242
240. See Williams, supra note 43, at 1303.
241. See SYLVIA ANN HEWLETT, WHEN THE BOUGH BREAKS 15, 72-83 (1991).
242. See SYLVIA ANN HEWLETT & CORNEL WEST, THE WAR AGAINST PARENTS 217
(1998).
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While the poll focused on legislation, the parenting dilemmas of
corporate employees do not always lend themselves to regulations of
general application. In part, they call for the sort of individual
solutions that can only result from management efforts seeking actively
to address employee needs. For example, a particular employer may
not be able to offer flextime to most employees but may have a suitable
place for an on-site day care facility. A standardized disclosure of
family-support practices could prompt management to periodically
examine a range of options to accommodate parental needs, while also
serving to inform job applicants about the company.
There can be no doubt that family-support policies lie within
management's fiduciary responsibilities to shareholders. By satisfying
the needs of parents, management may hope to reduce absenteeism,
improve employee recruitment, and enhance workforce loyalty and
trust. The public policy interest could not be more compelling. From
an anthropological perspective, child rearing is a critical function for
the survival of any culture. Yet, while some companies have offered
innovative assistance to parents, others have responded with
unreflecting rigidity and demands for longer hours of work.14' A
disclosure system, with the support of a shareholder bloc, could
stimulate a better response to the nurturing of future generations.244
C. Respect for Human Rights in Foreign Contracting
There may be occasions when the self-interest of U.S.
corporations engaged in foreign contracting calls for attention to
human rights.245 Using the example of a proposed gas pipeline in
Afghanistan, Blaine Townsend of Trillium Asset Management, an
ethical investment fund, argues that human rights violations often
signal risks that should be heeded in investment decisions.246 For
243. See HEWLETT, supra note 241, at 21-23, 203-13.
244. In addition to the flexible time issues mentioned above, a reporting system might
call for disclosure of such matters as: (1) on-site child care, (2) information and referral
service for child care, (3) health care coverage for dependents, (4) coverage of pre-natal
care, (5) maternity and paternity leave policies, (6) sick leave for children's illnesses, (7)
telecommuting and work-at-home alternatives, and (8) a dependant care plan offering
shorter hours and reduced salary.
245. See WILLIAM F. SCHULZ, IN OUR OWN BEST INTEREST, How DEFENDING HUMAN
RIGHTS BENEFITS Us ALL 66-104 (2001).
246. See Blaine Townsend, A Tip for Wall Street-Don't Help the Bad Guys, S.F.
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companies with valuable corporate or brand images, the most
immediate and obvious of these risks is the threat of adverse publicity
of labor rights violations. Spurred by disclosures of labor abuses,
major distributors of consumer goods have almost universally adopted
codes of conduct governing suppliers in developing countries, and, at
least in the apparel industry, pursued plans for a label system certifying
to fair labor practices. 47
Will these public relations efforts of image-conscious companies
actually serve the cause of labor rights? In the past five years, there
has been impressive progress in creating standards for acceptable labor
practices in developing countries. Social Accountability International,
an organization of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), unions,
and corporations, including Toys 'R' Us, promulgated a set of labor
standards, known as SA8000, in nine core areas, which seeks to build
on the quality assurance auditing system of the International
Organization of Standardization.248 A task force sponsored by the
Clinton Administration in 1996, the Apparel Industry Partnership,
established a similar Workplace Code for the apparel industry. 249
Other codes of conduct have been adopted by the Collegiate Licensing
Company for products bearing university logos, by the Federation
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) for soccer balls bearing
the FIFA logo, and by an Indian foundation that authorizes use of the
RUGMARK label for carpets manufactured without the use of child
labor.25°
Unfortunately, these private codes of conduct rely on monitoring
programs of questionable efficacy. Although the SA8000 and Apparel
Industry Partnership require audits by accredited outside firms, these
CHRON., Nov. 20, 2001, at A23.
247. See, e.g., Jorge F. Perez-Lopez, Promoting International Respect for Worker Rights
Through Business Codes of Conduct, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1 (1993); Ryan P. Toftoy,
Note, Now Playing: Corporate Codes of Conduct in the Global Theater. Is Nike Just Doing
It?, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 905 (1998).
248. See Williams, supra note 43, at 1202 n. 11, 1304-05; SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY
INTERNATIONAL, AN OVERVIEW OF SAI AND SA8000 at
http://www.cepaa.org/introduction.htm (last visited Dec. 26, 2001).
249. See Maria Gillen, The Apparel Industry Partnership's Free Labor Association: A
Solution to the Overseas Sweatshop Problem or the Emperor's New Clothes?, 32 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 1059, 1062-63 (2000); see generally Heidi S. Bloomfield, Note, 'Sweating'
the International Garment Industry: A Critique of the Presidential Task Force's Workplace
Codes of Conduct and Monitoring System, HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 567 (1999).
250. See Robert J. Liubicic, Corporate Codes of Conduct and Product Labeling
Schemes: The Limits and Possibilities of Promoting International Labor Rights Through
Private Initiatives, 30 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. t11, 130-32 (1998).
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firms lack any profit motive for zealous enforcement of labor standards
and suffer from identification with the company in seeking the
confidence of Workers. All private monitoring schemes-even the
relatively credible RUGMARK program-operate in varying degrees
of secrecy and fail to disclose information about violations and
violators.25
Time will tell whether these private initiatives of image-conscious
corporations will ultimately be regarded as a public-relations ruse 252 or
the leading edge in the development of an effective global system of
labor rights. 3  The matter is of great importance to the ethical
investment community. A 1999 poll indicates that 84% of Americans
think that manufacturers that employ contractors or workers are
responsible for preventing sweatshop conditions.254 A system of
shareholder democracy would enable ethically motivated investors to
better exert pressure for effective monitoring of overseas labor
practices, reflecting the strong support for such monitoring in the
American public.
D. Corporate Political Activities
The most inveterate foe of corporate power must concede that
there is an important difference between political activities directed at
laws and governmental policies impinging immediately on a
corporation's business operations and political activities that serve only
to promote management's social biases. The former lies within
management's fiduciary duty to oversee the conduct of the business
and often draws on specialized knowledge and business experience of
importance to the public. While environmentalists may disagree with
timber companies, they cannot deny that the companies possess
expertise in forestry practices that should be taken into account in
framing policy. But to the extent that management's political
251. See id at 134-39.
252. In Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 27 Cal. 4th 939, 969-70 (2002), the California Supreme
Court held that the public relations campaign of Nike, Inc. defending the labor practices of
its foreign contractors, constituted commercial speech that could be regulated to eliminate
false and misleading statements. See id.
253. For an analysis of how limited private initiatives may stimulate the later
development of effective public laws, see Liubicic, supra note 243, 149-58; Steven R.
Salbu, True Codes Versus Voluntary Codes of Ethics in International Markets: Towards the
Preservation of Colloquy in Emerging Global Communities, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 326,
353-68 (1994).
254. See Marymount Univ. Ctr. for Ethical Concerns, The Consumer and Sweatshops, at
http://www.marymount.edu/news/garmentstudy/question5.htmi (last visited Dec. 27, 2001).
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initiatives stray from the company's own operations and lose a direct
connection with management's fiduciary responsibilities, they may
pose a threat to democratic processes by allowing management to use
corporate treasuries to promote personal agendas.
A badly flawed Massachusetts statute seeking to enforce this vital
distinction through criminal sanctions fell prey to a constitutional
attack in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti.2" The statute
punished corporations and corporate officers for making any
contribution or expenditure in support of a state referendum measure
unless it was "one materially affecting any of the property, business or
assets of the corporation., 25 6 The statute was both too harsh and too
narrow. Criminal penalties should not be used to enforce a distinction
that is inherently difficult to draw; a large gray area is likely to exist
between those political measures pertaining to business interests and
those unrelated to the business. Again, the statute applied only to state
ballot measures, but the rationale for the distinction applies equally to
contributions to political candidates, public relations expenditures,
membership in politically active organizations, and monetary support
for foundations indirectly serving a political cause.
The plaintiffs who challenged the statute were two banks and
three business corporations that wished to spend corporate funds to
publicize their opposition to a ballot measure imposing a graduated
income tax on individuals-a matter having no direct relation to
banking or the other businesses. 257 In a 5-4 decision, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the statute abridged freedom of speech in violation of
the First and Fourteenth Amendments.258 The majority characterized
the statute as creating "an impermissible legislative prohibition of
speech based on the identity of the interests that spokesmen may
represent in public debate over controversial issues and a requirement
that the speaker have a sufficiently great interest in the subject to
justify communication. 259  In a dissenting opinion, Justice White
observed that the statute itself was designed to serve a First
Amendment interest, that is, to prevent corporate management from
exerting an undue influence in the political process by reason of its
255. 435 U.S. 765 (1977).
256. See id. at 768.
257. See id at 767-69.
258. See id
259. Id. at 784.
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control of the corporate treasury. In his view, the state legislature was
free to strike any reasonable balance between this constitutional
interest and the competing constitutional interests protecting corporate
speech.2 6°
My purpose here is not to critique the merits of the Bellotti
decision, but rather to note that, under a regime of shareholder
democracy, it would be possible to create a self-regulating system,
which would avoid the practical and constitutional difficulties of the
Massachusetts statute. An audit committee with genuine accountability
to investors is the key. In the wake of the recent Enron and WorldCom
scandals, an independent audit committee has emerged as a vital tool to
curb accounting abuses,2 6 ' but such an audit committee can also
oversee other forms of corporate disclosure. In particular, an
independent audit committee could assume the function of assuring
that political expenditures are confined to those closely pertaining to
the conduct of the corporation's business-the objective of the
Massachusetts statute.
With effective shareholder accountability, it becomes possible to
imagine that a board of directors would appoint an audit committee
charged with monitoring politically-related corporate activities so as
not to offend any shareholder constituency. The monitoring system
would presumably require detailed disclosure to shareholders of
corporate political expenditures 262 and would provide an internal
procedure allowing shareholders to challenge certain expenditures
before a representative of the audit committee.
The system could be either voluntary or mandatory. A voluntary
system would rely on the enhanced influence of the same coalition of
institutional investors that favors other corporate governance measures.
A mandatory system would proceed from a statutory or regulatory rule
requiring shareholder approval of spending on political measures
having no direct and material effect on the business. Any
260. For an illuminating theory of constitutionally protected corporate communications
that is generally consistent with Justice White's analysis, see Meir Dan-Cohen, Freedoms of
Collective Speech: A Theory of Protected Communications by Organizations, Communities
and the State, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1229, 1247 (1991).
261. An independent audit committee has long been an objective of institutional
shareholder activism. See, e.g., the TIAA-CREF website, at http://www.tiaa-
cref.org/siteline/gen020605 .html (last visited July 29, 2002).
262. Cynthia Williams suggests that the SEC proxy form could consolidate all required
disclosures of politically related expenditures. See Williams, supra note 43, at 1203 n.14.
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constitutional issue relating to freedom of expression would arise in a
context of autonomous corporate decision-making, which would
probably lead to a different result than in the Bellotti decision.
Apart from the issue of constitutionality, a self-regulating system
of private controls would again have practical advantages: (1) it could
make difficult and elusive distinctions that would represent an
impossible burden on a system of external controls, and (2) it could
extend to the full range of politically related activities, including
association memberships, lobbying initiatives, charitable contributions,
public relations expenditures, PAC sponsorships, and even corporate
communications. It is, of course, impossible to know whether
shareholder constituencies would lend enough support to such a system
to make it work effectively. But one can safely say that, in a system of
shareholder democracy, a self-governing system to guarantee strict
corporate political neutrality could be seriously contemplated.
E. Overview
A common theme runs through these distinct topics: there may be
pragmatic opportunities for shareholder action when matters lying
within management's fiduciary obligations affect social goals with
strong public support. These opportunities would be greatly enhanced
by a system of shareholder democracy giving a more effective voice to
constituencies representative of the American public.
V. CONCLUSION
At the beginning of this article, I cited Chancellor Allen's
observation that people have difficulty imagining any alternative to a
"truly dominant intellectual paradigm." 263 My purpose has been to
engage in an imaginative exploration of the outer limits of shareholder
democracy for the publicly held corporation. The article seeks to show
that the current paradigm of shareholder passivity and management
autonomy is embedded in a complex of regulatory laws. A
comprehensive revision of these laws-which necessarily implies
federal standards of corporate governance-would open opportunities
to create a meaningful system of shareholder democracy based on
representative associations of institutional shareholders. In addition to
cumulative voting, two procedural innovations are needed-the right of
263. See Allen, supra note 1, at 1401.
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shareholder associations to place director nominations on corporate
proxy cards, and the right of indirect shareowners to give voting
instructions to the fiduciaries of self-directed and defined-contribution
retirement plans.
An assumption runs through this article that should be reiterated
here: corporate decisions would often take different and more socially
constructive forms if they were framed in terms of a broader set of
relevant considerations. Twenty years ago, Christopher Stone
observed:
In the life of the enterprise, there are many occasions on which the
managers have no 'most profitable' option lying on their desks.
Considering the uncertainties in any business environment and the
limited data available to it, there will be some range of choices all
equally consistent with that ill-defined and elusive favorite of the
economics textbooks, the investment uniquely calculated to
maximize the shareholders' wealth.
264
Stone saw opportunities for corporate managers to take social criteria
into account within "this profit-undifferentiable range. 265 By doing
things that "present clear gains for the public and do not really conflict
with, and perhaps advance, the firm's own economic interest," the
managers are like to "identify possibilities of profit" they would never
discern if they "thought exclusively in terms of profit."266
By first surveying the range of shareholder constituencies, I
sought to show that shareholder democracy would cause corporate
decisions to be considered in a more open forum, having some
similarities to the German Aktiengesellschafte, which would give
expression to institutional shareholder groups with interests and
perspectives reflecting those of important segments of the American
public. Even though some of these groups may control a relatively
small share of voted stock, they could still influence the selection of
directors, with the aid of cumulative voting, by forming alliances with
other institutional investors and utilizing avenues of communication
with individual shareholders.
Paradoxically, the most significant implications of shareholder
264. Christopher D. Stone, Corporate Social Responsibility: What It Might Mean, if It
Were Really to Matter, 71 IOWA L. REV. 557, 568 (1986).
265. Id.
266. Id. at 569.
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democracy may concern the interests of employees and the community
at large. The forms of shareholder democracy could be used to add an
appropriate employee voice in corporate decisions through employee
stock ownership plans or by direct participation in the nomination
process. Shareholder democracy would also afford activist
shareholders pragmatic opportunities to pressure for change in those
areas where social policies with strong popular support lie within the
scope of management's fiduciary responsibilities.
